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Article 
CORPORATE FAMILY LAW 
Allison Anna Tait 
ABSTRACT—There is no such thing as corporate family law. But there are 
corporate families, and corporate families fight. What happens when 
corporate family members fight and the conflict is so severe that one or 
more of the parties wants out of the corporate relationship? Corporate law 
provides some solutions, but they are shaped by the assumption that all 
parties will bargain effectively for protections when seeking to exit a 
corporate relationship. Under this theory, family business is, after all, just 
business. The problem with this assumption is that corporate family 
members do not bargain the way that corporate law expects. Corporate 
family members are idiosyncratic bargainers who operate from a position 
of bounded rationality and self-interest. Consequently, they are unlikely to 
take steps to protect themselves against corporate oppression. The result is 
a mismatch between corporate law and its underlying assumptions for a 
substantial swath of family business owners who are subject to corporate 
law and corporate oppression. Thus far, lawmakers have not looked to 
family law to solve this problem. This Article argues that they should. 
Family wealth laws—divorce and inheritance—offer an alternate model of 
asset allocation at the end of a relationship, providing robust financial 
protections for parties who are vulnerable in light of their idiosyncratic 
bargaining position. Such laws provide the theoretical foundation for a 
more realistic and fair conception of protection for corporate family 
members subject to corporate oppression. There may be no such thing as 
corporate family law, but there should be. 
 
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. 
For comments and conversation along the way, I would like to thank Erez 
Aloni, Naomi Cahn, Jessica Clarke, Jessica Erickson, Martha Ertman, 
Meredith Harbach, Jill Hasday, Claudia Haupt, Mary Heen, Courtney 
Joslin, Corinna Lain, Ben Means, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Paula Shaefer, 
Cynthia Lee Starnes, and Sarah Swan. I also benefited greatly from 
workshop participants at Temple Law School and panel participants at both 
Law and Society and SEALS. For excellent research and editorial 
assistance, I thank Amanda Bird, Blake Grady and Erin Whelan; and I owe 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
2 
the editorial staff of the Northwestern University Law Review great thanks 
for their excellent editing and for all the hard work they have put into the 
editing process. 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 2 
I. CORPORATE OPPRESSION AND BARGAINING ............................................................. 8 
A. No Exit? The Plight of the Minority Shareholder ........................................... 9 
B. What Corporate Law Expects from People ................................................... 22 
C. Family Members’ Bounded Bargaining ........................................................ 23 
II. DISPATCHES FROM FAMILY LAW ............................................................................ 29 
A. Divorcing the Firm, Protecting the Spouse ................................................... 29 
B. Surviving Spouses Inherit the Firm ............................................................... 37 
C. Bargaining in the Shadow of Marriage ........................................................ 43 
III. BUILDING CORPORATE FAMILY LAW ..................................................................... 48 
A. Bringing Family Law into Corporate Law.................................................... 48 
B. Statutory Reform for Corporate Families ..................................................... 56 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 60 
 
Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way. 
—Leo Tolstoy† 
We sense that Tolsto[y] was less familiar with the American modern 
law of closely-held corporations . . . where the survival of a business 
association is so perilously tied to the continuing vitality of intimate 
personal relationships. 
—Judge Gerald J. Weber‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no such thing as corporate family law. But there are corporate 
families,1 and corporate families fight. Siblings undermine one another in 
 
 † LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Constance Garnett trans., Random House 1939) (1877). 
 ‡ Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.). 
 1 In this Article, I use the term corporate families to denote and discuss family-owned corporations 
that are closely held. A closely held corporation is a business organization typified by a small number 
of stockholders, the absence of a market for its stock, and substantial shareholder participation in the 
management of the corporation. The majority of closely held corporations are family businesses. See 
Robert T. Kleiman, updated by Laurie Collier Hillstrom, Closely Held Corporations, REFERENCE FOR 
BUS. (2017), http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Clo-Con/Closely-Held-
Corporations.html [https://perma.cc/UP4D-5RAC] (“Most—but not all—closely held firms are 
also family-owned businesses.”). Many family businesses are also, however, organized as partnerships 
or LLCs or in other noncorporate ways. I do not address these forms of organization in this Article but 
leave it for examination elsewhere. Moreover, I coin the term corporate families to focus on the fact 
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board meetings, children fire their parents, and warring parties use their 
corporate power to vindicate intergenerational feuds.2 What happens when 
the fighting is so ruthless that it becomes corporate oppression and one or 
more of the family members want out of the corporate relationship? The 
question has vexed even the United States Supreme Court, and as the 
Justices in Hobby Lobby3 recently recognized, there is no easy answer. 
Corporate law provides some solutions to the problem of exit in the 
face of corporate oppression.4 Most obviously, an individual family 
member can sell her shares as long as she can find a purchaser. The 
problem is that most family business shares have no market value because 
the companies are not publically traded, and in addition, family business 
shares often come with transfer restrictions.5 Alternatively, most state 
corporate laws accord certain rights and remedies to minority shareholders 
in closely held corporations who are being oppressed and have no real exit 
 
that family relationships are negotiated through the corporation, as opposed to using the more common 
term family corporations, in which family is merely a modifier and not the conceptual core. 
 2 The frequency of infighting in family businesses has not been quantified. Many commentators 
suggest that the risk of corporate family conflict is high. Because family businesses ask individuals to 
“span multiple social categories . . . . tensions are particularly endemic to [these] businesses.” David 
Whetten et al., Organizational Identity and Family Business, in SAGE, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
FAMILY BUSINESS 480, 484 (Leif Melin et al. eds., 2014). Commentators also note that “when it does 
break out, the fighting tends to be more intense.” Josh Baron & Rob Lachenauer, Why Fights Erupt in 
Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul. 9, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/07/why-fights-erupt-in-family-
bus [https://perma.cc/BW2Q-F5QT]. Corporate family disputes are more intense, some authors 
speculate, “because they can [be]. In nonfamily businesses, there are barriers to keep things from 
escalating. Owning the business removes many of these barriers. Once a conflict starts, it can easily 
spiral out of control.” Id.; see also D’Lisa McKee et al., Conflicts in Family Firms: The Good and the 
Bad, in SAGE, supra, at 514, 514 (“Conflict can be particularly taxing as family entanglements worsen 
stressful situations . . . . Overlapping family and business relationships may complicate how firms are 
managed and potentially increase the intensity and frequency of conflicts.” (citations omitted)). 
 3 The question was posed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and Justice Ginsburg, in her 
dissent, remarked: “[T]he Court [does not] offer any instruction on how to resolve the disputes that may 
crop up among corporate owners over religious values and accommodations.” 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 
n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority opinion noted this concern but left the question of 
corporate family conflict unanswered. Id. at 2774 (majority opinion) (“HHS and the principal dissent 
express concern about the possibility of disputes among the owners of corporations . . . .”). The Court 
concluded: “The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and 
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious 
beliefs.” Id. 
 4 Shareholder oppression, discussed further infra pp. 9−21, involves the majority shareholder(s) in 
a closely held corporation blocking the minority from having any real voice in corporate governance or 
extracting any value from their shares. 
 5 The majority of family businesses organized in the corporate form are closely held. Robert T. 
Kleiman, updated by Laurie Collier Hillstrom, supra note 1. In this Article, I discuss this significant 
subset of closely held corporations. There are some publicly traded corporations that are family 
controlled; however, this is a small percentage of family businesses, and minority shareholder 
oppression is not a problem in these companies because shares are publicly valued and traded and, 
consequently, a minority shareholder can sell her shares for fair market value. 
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options.6 The standard for what constitutes corporate oppression is, 
however, far from clear, and relief is not at all guaranteed. This lack of 
robust legal protections for minority shareholders is not an oversight. 
Corporate law protections are purposefully limited because corporate law is 
grounded in the expectation that parties will bargain efficiently and seek to 
maximize their own benefit.7 Corporate law presupposes rational actors 
making rational choices, and consequently places the responsibility for 
self-protection squarely on the individual.8 
Many times this set of rules and assumptions makes sense, particularly 
when it comes to those bargaining for and purchasing stock in public 
companies on the open market. These rules do not make sense when it 
comes to corporate families. Corporate family members do not bargain in 
the way that laws and norms expect them to bargain. From the outset, 
corporate family members—siblings, cousins, parents, and nephews and 
nieces—do not generally bargain to obtain the shares they possess. Rather, 
they inherit them or receive them as gifts. In addition, corporate family 
members are not the classic rational actors that corporate law and economic 
theory expect them to be. Corporate family members are, as behavioral 
economists understand, “bounded”9 rational actors who are enmeshed in a 
complex set of interlocking relationships that intertwine the personal with 
the professional.10 First, corporate family members operate from a position 
 
 6 See discussion infra Section III.B for examples of the kinds of protections afforded by various 
state laws. 
 7 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (“[P]arties 
who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”). For further discussion 
about the norms that inform corporate law, see infra Section I.B., pp. 22–23. 
 8 For examples of economists who propound rational choice theory, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (5th ed. 1998); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking 
at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385 (1993). 
 9 I use the term bounded as it is used in the behavioral economics literature, to indicate the limits of 
an individual’s rational choice and agency. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Inductive Reasoning and 
Bounded Rationality, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 406, 406 (1994) (“The type of rationality assumed in 
economics—perfect, logical, deductive rationality—is extremely useful in generating solutions to 
theoretical problems. But it demands much of human behavior, much more in fact than it can usually 
deliver.”); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 692 (1996) 
(“Psychology and economics provide wide-ranging evidence that bounded rationality is 
important . . . .”); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (“[R]ational models are psychologically 
unrealistic.”). 
 10 In this way, corporate family members exemplify aspects of behavioral law and economics, 
acting in ways that rational choice theory does not expect. For a sampling of behavioral law and 
economics, see Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
112:1 (2017) Corporate Family Law 
5 
of bounded rationality, impacted by personal tensions, desires, and 
loyalties. That is to say, corporate family members do not act in the way 
that corporate law expects them to act because, as one court remarked, 
“many lawsuits arising from disputes among shareholders in closely-held 
corporations are characterized by the parties’ inability to separate the 
business and personal aspects of their relationship.”11 In addition, corporate 
family members also operate from a position of bounded self-interest: they 
are idiosyncratic bargainers who may prioritize values over profits and 
family legacy over maximal efficiency.12 
That corporate family members are treated like any other business co-
owners and do not receive many financial protections in the face of 
corporate oppression is consequently problematic. And it is no small 
matter. Family businesses are ubiquitous in the United States and are often 
described as “the backbone” of the American economy.13 These enterprises 
predominate in the marketplace,14 constituting approximately 80% of 
business enterprises in the United States,15 employing 60% of workers, and 
creating 78% of new jobs.16 Family businesses have been a staple of 
American capitalism—just as entrepreneurialism has been a decidedly 
 
 11 Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.). 
 12 Behavioralists might argue that all corporate actors are bounded in these same ways and that the 
classical idea of the rational actor is normatively flawed across the board. I would agree with that 
assertion, but I argue here that family members are even more “bounded” in their bargaining than other 
actors. Family businesses, as the business literature describes, are hybrid-identity organizations that 
require corporate stakeholders to negotiate not only workplace conflict but also social-role confusion. 
Ritch L. Sorenson, Values in Family Business, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY BUSINESS, supra 
note 2, at 463, 472. Corporate family members are therefore called upon to exercise extra measures of 
care, diplomacy, and sensitivity as they go about the work of the corporation. As they well know, 
“family problems can become business problems, and business disagreements can further sour family 
relations.” Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 
1212–13 (2013) [hereinafter Means, Nonmarket Values]. 
 13 ANDREA COLLI, THE HISTORY OF FAMILY BUSINESS, 1850–2000 8 (2003); Family Business 
Facts, CONWAY CTR. FOR FAM. BUS., http://www.familybusinesscenter.com/resources/family-business-
facts [https://perma.cc/Y7NM-TXBY]. 
 14 See Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
675, 676 (2014) [hereinafter Means, The Contractual Foundation] (“Most U.S. businesses are family 
owned . . . .”); see also Joseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, Family Businesses’ 
Contribution to the U.S. Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 211, 216 (2003) (finding that, 
according to the broadest definition of family business, 89% of businesses in the United States are 
family businesses). 
 15 See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 274 (4th ed. 2013) 
(stating that over 80% of business enterprises in the United States are family owned). 
 16 MATTHEW R. MARVEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW VENTURE MANAGEMENT 190 (2012). See 
generally Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses, 65 EMORY L.J. 937 (2016) 
[hereinafter Means, Wealth Inequality] (suggesting that family businesses may disrupt entrenched 
hierarchies and create opportunities for many ethnic communities). 
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American value—since colonial America.17 Small producers of craft 
products are predominantly family businesses, but many family-owned or 
controlled companies are also “economic powerhouses.”18 In fact, 
approximately “35 percent of Fortune 500 companies are family-
controlled”19 and major companies such as Cargill and Hobby Lobby are 
family-owned and controlled.20 In short, the problem of family members 
exiting in the face of corporate oppression is one worth fixing. 
Fortunately, models for treating corporate partners differently on the 
basis of their familial ties already exist for a subset of corporate family 
members: corporate spouses. When corporate spouses encounter severe 
conflict and seek exit, they have options in family law.21 Divorce and 
inheritance law both offer models of asset allocation at relationship 
termination that differ from the traditional corporate law model. An 
unhappy spouse looking to leave the corporate relationship can always 
pursue a divorce. And through the equitable division of the marital estate, a 
corporate spouse can receive up to half of the couple’s corporate assets.22 
Likewise, if one spouse tries to disinherit the other, the surviving spouse 
can still receive a substantial share of the deceased spouse’s estate. 
Through intestacy rights or by electing to take the forced spousal share, the 
surviving spouse could receive between a third and a half of the deceased 
spouse’s assets, including corporate assets.23 Unlike other corporate family 
 
 17 See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Family Firms in the United States, 1 FAM. BUS. 
REV. 51, 60–61 (1988). 
 18 See, e.g., America’s Largest Private Companies: #2 Koch Industries, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2008, 
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/21/privates08_Koch-Industries_VMZQ.html 
[https://perma.cc/T232-3QD3]; Our History, MARS (2017), http://www.mars.com/global/about-
us/history [https://perma.cc/W4QJ-T3N2 ] (explaining that Mars is still family owned but the leadership 
team is currently composed of nonfamily members). 
 19 CONWAY CTR. FOR FAM. BUS., supra note 13. 
 20 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Hobby Lobby dissent: 
“Closely held” is not synonymous with “small.” Hobby Lobby is hardly the only enterprise of 
sizable scale that is family owned or closely held. For example, the family-owned candy giant 
Mars, Inc., takes in $33 billion in revenues and has some 72,000 employees, and closely held 
Cargill, Inc., takes in more than $136 billion in revenues and employs some 140,000 persons. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see 
also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1041, 1090–91 (2013) (explaining that the term small in the context of firm size, is not defined by its 
common usage and is instead used to describe larger, more powerful firms). According to one study, 
“[c]lose corporations account for most of American business” and “[f]amily-owned businesses alone 
represent ninety-five percent of all United States businesses.” Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder 
Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990). 
 21 I use family law in this Article to encompass both divorce and inheritance law. This may, more 
technically, be family wealth law because it draws inheritance into the family law domain. 
 22 See discussion of corporate assets and equitable distribution infra Section 2.A. 
 23 See discussion of corporate assets, intestacy, and elective share rules infra Section 2.B. 
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members, corporate spouses receive this privileged treatment based on their 
presumed inability to bargain at arm’s length as well as the presence of a 
default marital bargain.24 And while the marital relationship is certainly 
exceptional in many ways, the ways in which personal feelings can impact 
bargaining is not necessarily unique to spouses. Other corporate family 
members are bounded or impaired bargainers in the same way, and they, 
mistakenly, do not benefit from the presumption of idiosyncratic 
bargaining.25 
In light of how ubiquitous the family business is and the impact of 
these businesses on the economy, it is somewhat surprising that legal 
scholars have paid little attention to the legal problems of corporate 
families.26 The work that has been done has addressed corporate law and 
family law in isolation. Corporate law scholars have addressed minority 
shareholder oppression in closely held corporations.27 Business scholars 
have studied the subject, writing case studies about family businesses28 and 
investigating questions such as whether business outcomes are better or 
worse in family-run enterprises.29 Family law scholars have, for their part, 
 
 24 Marriage law bases its protections on twin assumptions: a spouse’s inability to explicitly bargain 
coupled with the acceptance of an implicit bargain. The implicit marital bargain is based on coverture 
rules and is an exchange of financial support for domestic care. 
 25 It may be that all corporate parties are impaired bargainers, taking behavioral theory seriously. In 
addition, there may be other corporate parties who are especially bounded bargainers—friends who start 
businesses together, in particular. However, family members are the most obviously impacted by the 
overlap between personal and corporate roles just as they are also the easiest group to define and 
delimit. A next step, for consideration outside of this Article but based on the concepts introduced 
herein, might be to consider the law of “corporate friends.” 
 26 Means, The Contractual Foundation, supra note 14, at 676–77; see also COLLI, supra note 13, at 
73 (“[D]espite the relevance of the subject, there is a surprising lack of theoretical, economic 
research . . . .”). 
 27 See, e.g., Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, 
Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371 (2003); Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 
(2003) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy]; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 
54 DUKE L.J. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,”]; Samuel E. 
Neschis, Reasonable Expectations of Shareholder-Employees in Closely Held Corporations: Towards a 
Standard of When Termination of Employment Constitutes Shareholder Oppression, 13 DEPAUL BUS. 
& COM. L.J. 301 (2015).  
 28 See, e.g., Francesco Chirico, Knowledge Accumulation in Family Firms: Evidence from Four 
Case Studies, 26 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 433 (2008); Bart J. Debicki et al., Family Business Research in 
the New Millennium: An Overview of the Who, the Where, the What, and the Why, 22 FAM. BUS. REV. 
151 (2009); A. B. Ibrahim et al., A Study of Succession in a Family Firm, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 245 
(2001); Pramodita Sharma, An Overview of the Field of Family Business Studies: Current Status and 
Directions for the Future, 17 FAM. BUS. REV. 1 (2004). 
 29 See, e.g., Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for 
Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1 (1999); Danny Miller et al., 
Stewardship vs. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non-Family Businesses, 
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pressed on the analogy between corporate and marital relationships as a 
way of better understanding spousal rights and responsibilities, particularly 
at divorce.30 Few legal scholars, however, have addressed the entwinement 
of family relations with corporate ownership and governance.31 This 
analysis therefore not only fills a gap but also builds a new bridge between 
corporate and family law scholarship. 
This Article, then, examines the bargaining norms that shape both 
corporate law and family law and proposes that these norms be recalibrated 
in such a way as to provide increased financial protections for vulnerable 
corporate family members. The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I 
discusses minority shareholder oppression and shows how corporate family 
members are particularly vulnerable to classic techniques of corporate 
oppression. Part I also offers an analysis of bargaining norms underlying 
corporate law and demonstrates why they are inappropriate when applied to 
corporate family members. Part II turns to family law and sets forth not 
only the rules for corporate spouses but also how and why these particular 
corporate family members receive relatively robust protections. Part III 
proposes several paths toward creating a new domain of corporate family 
law. Part III suggests several ways in which family law models solutions 
and offers ideas for statutory reform. At the moment, there is no such thing 
as corporate family law. But we can and should build it. 
I. CORPORATE OPPRESSION AND BARGAINING 
Corporate law and corporate governance rules provide a limited 
means of conflict resolution within a family business. This Section 
analyzes the legal framework of minority shareholder oppression as well as 
the norms that inform the basic judicial approach to corporate oppression 
claims. Using recent minority shareholder oppression cases, I emphasize 
why current protections are insufficient to protect corporate family 
members. I also explain why the bargaining norms that undergird the 
corporate law framework are misapplied in the case of corporate families, 
 
45 J. MGMT. STUD. 51 (2008); Andy Yu et al., The Landscape of Family Business Outcomes: A 
Summary and Numerical Taxonomy of Dependent Variables, 25 FAM. BUS. REV. 33 (2012 ). 
 30 See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF 
U.S. ALIMONY LAW (2014); Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 
(2005); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001). 
 31 For notable exceptions, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder 
Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) [hereinafter Means, A Contractual Approach]; 
Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 12; Means, The Contractual Foundation, supra note 14; Means, 
Wealth Inequality, supra note 16. Means is also critical of applying the rational actor model to family 
business members and proposes private ordering and contractual solutions that turn on good faith and 
fair dealing as well as shared understandings of family business values. 
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jeopardizing the ability of corporate family members to extract any value 
from their shares in the family business, thereby impairing their ability to 
exit a corporate relationship. 
A. No Exit? The Plight of the Minority Shareholder 
Corporate families can fight about corporate strategy, board 
composition, payment of bonuses, advertisement campaigns, and office 
space. Frequently, these disputes within a family business are intertwined 
with the minority shareholder status of one party. Minority shareholder 
status generates conflict and creates problematic results because the 
minority party will always be overruled or outvoted. Minority shareholders 
are consequently subject to oppression and mistreatment at the hands of the 
majority shareholder, and conflicts cannot be resolved through shareholder 
voting or board reorganization.32 This Section explores the legal 
background for minority shareholder oppression, the few and insufficient 
remedies that are available, and why the existing framework is particularly 
bad for corporate family members. 
1.  The Classic Corporate Oppression Framework 
Minority shareholder oppression is, as we will see, notoriously 
difficult to define. Compounding the problem, a minority stakeholder lacks 
not only agency within the corporation but also a practical way to exit the 
corporation.33 Because a minority stakeholder’s shares do not have a 
market value, the most likely purchaser is the majority shareholder. The 
majority shareholder can, consequently, force the minority shareholder into 
accepting a low price for the shares unless she wants to be “locked into” 
the corporation. Furthermore, even if the shareholder found another buyer 
 
 32 Elizabeth Pollman states that Hobby Lobby is similarly silent on how these mechanisms might 
work (or not work): “The separate roles of the board and the shareholders inevitably lead to the question 
of whether the board has the power to determine a religious purpose for the corporation.” Elizabeth 
Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
149, 166 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). Likewise, “[i]f shareholder consent is sufficient or 
required for determining the religious purpose of the corporation, must it be unanimous? Again, we face 
a question not as readily answered as the Court suggested.” Id. 
 33 Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217 (2009) [hereinafter Means, A Voice-
Based Framework] (“[M]inority shareholder oppression in close corporations turns on one critical fact: 
minority shareholders have no practical ability to sell their shares and exit without the majority’s 
consent.”). See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4–5 (1970) (identifying economic pressure (exit) 
and political influence (voice) as the two primary mechanisms a firm’s members or customers may have 
available to protect their interests). 
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willing to accept a minority stake, transfer restrictions often apply.34 The 
result of this oppression is that the minority shareholder in a closely held 
corporation is in a position that is “as unique as it is precarious” because 
she is subject to the “dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an 
indefinite exclusion from sharing in the profitability of the firm.”35 
Faced with oppressive actions and a vulnerable position, minority 
shareholders do have some legal rights and remedies. However, while 
virtually all states, with the notable exception of Delaware, offer some kind 
of statutory or common law protection for oppressed minority 
shareholders,36 the protections that do exist are far from uniform or robust. 
Instead, protections across states are “[a] true legislative and judicial 
patchwork.”37 Moreover, “[t]he current panoply of claims and relief does 
not efficiently address the underlying problems of majority power and 
minority illiquidity in the closely held business.”38 
A number of state statutes enforce a heightened fiduciary duty39 for 
the majority shareholder in a closely held corporation. In a classic case 
interpreting these fiduciary duties, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court sided with the minority shareholder in concluding that “stockholders 
in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary 
duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another,”40 
namely utmost good faith. Shareholders in a close corporation, the court 
remarked, were more akin to partners because of “the trust and confidence 
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent 
 
 34 “[B]ecause of the close personal relationship that characterizes the closely held business, the 
participants often affirmatively restrict who can join the enterprise in order to avoid being stuck in an 
intimate relationship with someone with whom they are not compatible.” Robert B. Thompson, 
Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988) 
[hereinafter Thompson, Corporate Dissolution]. 
 35 J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory 
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977). 
 36 For more about the statutory landscape, see infra Section III.B.2. 
 37 John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the 
Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661 (2007) (“Each state has a unique regime for 
addressing minority shareholder oppression in closely held businesses—a surprising state of affairs for 
such an important area of corporate law.”). 
 38 Id. at 690. 
 39 A number of state courts “have imposed an enhanced fiduciary duty between close corporation 
shareholders and have allowed an oppressed shareholder to bring a direct cause of action for breach of 
this duty.” Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 851. These states 
include Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 37, at 664, 
700 app. 
 40 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (footnotes omitted). 
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danger to minority interests in the close corporation.”41 However, defining 
the type of heightened fiduciary duty and when it is breached has posed 
problems for courts faced with the question. In addition, courts are 
deferential to corporate decisionmakers, and the primacy of the business 
judgment rulea presumption that a corporate decisionmaker acted in 
good faith and fair dealingworks against minority plaintiffs.42 
Instead of heightened fiduciary duty, other states provide relief for a 
minority shareholder when her reasonable expectations are violated.43 
Using the reasonable expectations approach, “corporate decisions may be 
found oppressive because they violate the expectations that the minority 
reasonably maintained toward employment, remuneration, or control.”44 
One benefit of this approach is that it is more flexible and allows courts to 
analyze expectations contextually. For example, “shareholder relationships 
in a family corporation may be quite different than those in a venture 
capital-funded start up.”45 Like with heightened fiduciary duty, the majority 
shareholder “owes additional duties to the minority,”46 but under the 
reasonable expectations rubric, “those duties are defined by an account of 
what it is reasonable for the minority to expect from the majority.”47 
 
 41 Id. A number of corporate family cases involve fiduciary duty in the trust law context when 
corporate shares are held in trust. See, e.g., Collins v. Nugent, 443 N.E.2d 277, 284−89 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982) (discussing fiduciary relationship between trust beneficiary and her half brother in case involving 
family-owned business); Jennings v. Murdock, 553 P.2d 846, 870–71 (Kan. 1976) (finding that 
institutional trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty by failing to restrain a cotrustee from urging the 
sale of family newspaper business, even though the purpose of the trust was to keep the newspaper in 
the family). The fiduciary duty analysis in the trust law context is similar to the analysis in this 
heightened fiduciary duty context. Moreover, a number of trust law cases explore what the appropriate 
fiduciary duty standard is in these scenarios. See, e.g., Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 864 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1981) (“[A] trustee generally is duty-bound to exercise such care and diligence as a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise.” (citations omitted)). For additional discussion of fiduciary duty 
standards in trust law, see infra Section III.B.2. 
 42 See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
 43 A 2007 survey found that twenty states applied the reasonable expectations standard and one 
additional state used reasonable expectations as a factor in assessing corporate oppression. Matheson & 
Maler, supra note 37, at 664, 700 app. (see appendix for grid and survey of state law). 
 44 Art, supra note 27, at 373. 
 45 Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1227. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. “In short, then, the ‘rights or interests’ of a shareholder in any given case will not necessarily 
be the same ‘rights or interests’ of any other shareholder.” Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 
563 (N.C. 1983). In Meiselman, the court held: 
[A] trial court is: (1) to define the “rights or interests” the complaining shareholder has in the 
corporation; and (2) to determine whether some form of relief is “reasonably necessary” for the 
protection of those “rights or interests[.”] For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations 
analysis, he must prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations known or 
assumed by the other participants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was 
without fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the 
circumstances of the case plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
12 
The problem with these statutes is that the reasonable expectations 
approach “does not necessarily require strong protection of minority 
shareholders.”48 Interpretive leeway can and has led to great variability 
across the states, jeopardizing the minimal protection afforded to the 
minority shareholder. Moreover, courts also state an obligation to take into 
account the reasonable expectations of the majority shareholder. As the 
New Jersey Supreme Court observed: “The statute not only protects the 
minority stockholder, but I view it also as a protection, as well, perhaps not 
intentionally drawn, for the majority.”49 
And then there’s Delaware. Most notably, Delaware courts do not 
enforce a higher fiduciary duty or reasonable expectations framework. 
Instead, they deploy general corporate law principles and rely on “entire 
fairness as a means of protecting minority stockholders.”50 Delaware courts 
have declined to offer more protection, suggesting that it is the 
responsibility of the stockholder (or purchaser) to bargain for protections 
before acquiring closely held stock: “[A] stockholder intending to buy into 
a minority position in a Delaware corporation may enter into definitive 
stockholder agreements, and such agreements may provide for elaborate 
earnings tests, buyout provisions, voting trusts, or other voting 
agreements.”51 
The bargaining expectation precludes legal remedies in the absence of 
self-dealing or any other similarly conflicted transaction on the part of the 
majority shareholder. 
Accordingly, a minority shareholder is not totally without recourse. 
However, as a Pennsylvania court remarked: “We find ourselves struck by 
the unavailability or inadequacy of identifiable legal remedies to aid 
minority shareholders in redressing abuses by majority shareholders 
equipped with unfettered power over the management of the close 
corporation.”52 Shareholder options are limited by state statutory rules, 
judicial deference to the business judgment rule, and a related judicial 
resistance to reading oppression statues expansively. In addition, looking to 
Delaware, states like Oklahoma also offer no protection, expecting the 
parties to bargain and safeguarding contractual autonomy. None of these 
 
Id. at 564. 
 48 Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1227. 
 49 Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1024 (N.J. 1993). 
 50 Blaustein v. Lord Baltimore Capital Corp., C.A. No. 6685-VCN, 2013 WL 1810956, at *14 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 30, 2013), aff’d, 84 A.3d 954 (Del. 2014). 
 51 Id. at *15. 
 52 Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.). 
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options for minority shareholders take into account the deeply difficult 
position of the oppressed corporate family member and they overestimate 
the capacity and inclination of these individuals to bargain for protections. 
2. Freezing and Squeezing out Family Members 
While minority shareholder oppression may be difficult to define, 
there are nonetheless hallmark indicators of oppression in family 
businesses. Majority shareholders use a range of common techniques to 
“freeze” or “squeeze” out the minority party, including “the refusal to 
declare dividends, the termination of a minority shareholder’s employment, 
the removal of a minority shareholder from a position of management, and 
the siphoning off of corporate earnings through high compensation to the 
majority shareholder.”53 These are “devastatingly effective”54 techniques 
that strip minority shareholders of their role, voice, and even income.55 This 
Section analyzes how these cases arise in family businesses and how courts 
treat them. I focus on the obstacles that minority shareholders face when 
pressing their claims of corporate oppression and, ultimately, the absence 
of real remedies for these corporate family members seeking to exit the 
corporation. 
a. Challenging the Failure to Pay Dividends 
The decision to withhold the payment of dividends in a closely held 
corporation can be a significant action because the retention and 
reinvestment of company profits means that a minority shareholder in a 
family business loses her ability to profit from or even just capture the 
value of her shares.56 Consequently, “[f]or the minority shareholder to 
receive a return on investment . . . dividends are needed, as capital 
 
 53 Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 848; see also F. Hodge 
O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 
121 (1987) (“Minority shareholders frequently are deprived of any income from the corporations, either 
in the form of dividends or salary; they are not allowed any effective voice in business decisions; and 
they are denied any information about corporate affairs.”). 
 54 O’Neal, supra note 53, at 126. 
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may be trapped in a disadvantageous 
situation. No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The 
outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, the minority stockholder may be 
compelled to deal with the majority. This is the capstone of the majority plan. Majority “freeze-
out” schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at 
inadequate prices. 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). 
 55 Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1208 (“Investing in a closely held 
corporation is a risky proposition unless you hold the controlling stake or have bargained for additional 
protections. Your investment is likely to be a large percentage of your total wealth, and, although you 
may rely upon family relationships or friendships, those are not legal protections.” (footnote omitted)). 
 56 Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 860. 
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appreciation is difficult (if not impossible) to realize.”57 The importance of 
dividends in this context may decrease if all shareholders are salaried 
employees of the company;58 however, the payment of dividends remains 
an important output of compensation for shareholders. Withholding 
dividends is, therefore, a simple way to put “great pressure on minority 
shareholders pressed for funds.”59 
The issue for minority shareholders faced with this problem is that 
“many courts apparently feel that there is a legitimate sphere in which the 
controlling [directors or] shareholders can act in their own interest even if 
the minority suffers.”60 The primacy and entrenchment of the business 
judgment rule works against the minority interest.61 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in a leading fiduciary duty case, pointed to this 
problem, stating: “[C]ourts fairly consistently have been disinclined to 
interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the 
selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, 
which essentially involve management decisions subject to the principle of 
majority control.”62 That is to say, if majority shareholders can articulate a 
legitimate business reason for the failure to pay dividends, then the 
minority shareholder’s claim is likely to fail. 
In an exemplary case, Davis v. Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc.,63 the Oregon 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant was not liable for majority 
oppression in a case about bonuses because he was able to advance a 
legitimate business purpose. Two friends, Brockamp and Jaeger, started a 
construction company (BJI) in 1985, and shares in that company eventually 
passed to Jaeger’s sons and also son-in-law, who eventually became the 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 “It is generally acknowledged that, in close corporations, shareholders often work for the 
corporation, and corporate dividends are often paid in the form of a salary.” Franchino v. Franchino, 
687 N.W.2d 620, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
 59 O’Neal, supra note 53, at 125. 
 60 Id.; see also Comment, Minority Rights and the Corporate “Squeeze” and “Freeze,” 
1959 DUKE L.J. 436, 437 (1959). 
 61 Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1983) (“‘[T]wo principal conceptualistic 
barriers to the courts’ granting relief to aggrieved shareholders’ in such a situation are: ‘(1) the principle 
of majority rule in corporate management and (2) the business judgment rule.’” (quoting F. O’NEAL, 
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.04, at 582 (1975))). 
 62 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976). 
 63 174 P.3d 607, 609 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“BJI is a construction company founded by John 
Brockamp and Roy Jaeger, who were initially the sole shareholders. In 1985, defendant, who was a 
company employee, became a shareholder. At that time, each of the three shareholders owned 50 
shares, and all three served as corporate directors. Brockamp retired in 1993 and sold his shares to BJI. 
On several occasions thereafter, Roy Jaeger gave some of his shares to his sons, Craig and Chris, and to 
plaintiff, who is Roy Jaeger’s son-in-law . . . .”). 
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plaintiff in the case.64 The son-in-law’s claim against the company65 
centered on the relative amounts of bonuses distributed annually in lieu of 
dividends. The court observed: “Given that all of its shareholders were also 
employees, BJI distributed its profits as annual bonuses, rather than 
dividends, in order to reduce the company’s tax liability.”66 Tax planning 
was, according to the court, a perfectly legitimate business reason for 
choosing to give bonuses rather than dividends. 
When the two original partners had been working, the bonuses had 
been relatively equivalent. However, after the one partner departed, the 
other partner began to calculate bonuses based on determination of 
individual contribution, as assessed by him. According to this system, in 
2000 the plaintiff received $131,325 as a bonus and the defendant received 
$934,267 or, as the court noted, 7.1 times the amount of plaintiff’s bonus.67 
Two years later, using the same contribution theory, the plaintiff’s 
contributions earned him a bonus of $20,000 while the defendant took 
home $525,00026.3 times the amount of plaintiff’s bonus.68 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the plaintiff quit and thereafter filed a suit, claiming 
minority shareholder oppression, among other things. 
At trial, witnesses established that the defendant majority shareholder 
had terminated the weekly management meeting as well as annual 
shareholder meetings. The plaintiff claimed that it was the defendant who 
had problems getting along with the others, stating: “[T]he meetings just 
weren’t really productive anymore because nobody, you know—they 
couldn’t agree with [defendant]. And so [defendant] just canceled them or 
he wouldn’t show up and we would arbitrarily cancel.”69 The defendant 
himself admitted that he had stopped having meetings because the son-in-
law “didn’t get along very well” with his brothers-in-law.70 In addition, one 
of the minority shareholders who had resigned and, in exchange, succeeded 
in redeeming his shares testified that “the minority shareholders were 
dissatisfied with the level of control they had over the company and that 
‘the majority’ of the minority shareholders felt that they did not have a 
voice in the company.”71 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 At the time that the son-in-law made his claim, the company was being run by a former 
employee, Terry Greenman, who had obtained shares while Jaeger and Brockamp were still running the 
company. 
 66 Id. at 610. 
 67 Id. at 611. 
 68 Id. at 612. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision 
that there was no oppression, remarking: “[A] majority shareholder’s 
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing are discharged if the 
majority’s decisions are ‘made in good faith and reflect[ ] legitimate 
business purposes rather than the private interests of those in control.’”72 
Accordingly, under a good faith analysis, the court concluded “that the 
bonuses that defendant paid reflected a legitimate business purpose—
namely, creating incentive for the shareholders to increase BJI’s 
profitability.”73 The minority shareholder had no recourse because of the 
application of the business judgment rule in the context of shareholder 
oppression. 
Freezing out a minority shareholder by the refusal to pay dividends is, 
therefore, a relatively simple tactic as long as the majority shareholder can 
present the court with someanylegitimate business purpose. 
b. You’re Fired!74 Termination as Oppression 
Another common squeeze-out technique is the termination of a 
minority shareholder’s employment. Termination is a frequently deployed 
technique in family businesses because “shareholders in close corporations 
are often members of the corporation’s management.”75 Moreover, 
employment termination in these companies is especially injurious because 
“[i]t is generally acknowledged that, in close corporations, shareholders 
often work for the corporation, and corporate dividends are often paid in 
the form of a salary.”76 Accordingly, if the minority shareholder does not 
hold a position in the company, the majority might choose to withhold 
dividends. If, on the other hand, the minority shareholder holds a paid 
position, the majority may be likely to choose employment termination. 
The problems confronting a terminated family employee trying to 
prevail on an oppression claim, however, are numerous. As with failure to 
pay dividends, legitimate business reasons may justify termination of 
employment. Furthermore, if an employee does not have a contract that 
explicitly states the terms of employment, any employment is usually 
considered to be at will. Finally, courts sometimes throw out employment 
termination claims in the context of shareholder oppression because 
 
 72 Id. at 615 (citing Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977)). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Holly Hillis, Donald Trump “You’re Fired,” YOUTUBE (May 6, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75SEy1qu71I [https://perma.cc/2JRW-WTW6]. 
 75 Franchino v. Franchino, 687 N.W.2d 620, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
 76 Id. 
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“employment and board membership are not generally listed among rights 
that automatically accrue to shareholders.”77 
To begin with, any claim of minority shareholder oppression based on 
employment termination will likely fail if there is the possibility of 
employee fault. In Grill v. Aversa, a case about a conflict between two 
brothers-in-law who were both shareholders in a company that trained 
commercial truck drivers,78 the court was unwilling to find that one of the 
brothers-in-law had been subject to minority shareholder oppression when 
his employment was terminated.79 Based on the testimony of the two men, 
the court stated that the evidence permitted but did not “compel an 
inference that this termination arises out of family acrimony and attempts at 
shareholder oppression.”80 However, the court added, “it is equally true that 
substantial evidence was presented demonstrating that Sage was justified in 
terminating Grill’s employment.”81 If a legitimate motive coexists 
alongside another, less legitimate one, then courts will generally decline to 
find oppressive behavior. In these claims, then, employment law and 
shareholder law intersect, reproducing the difficulties of “mixed motive” 
employment cases in the oppression context. 
Terminated employees also encounter difficulties because, in the 
absence of a written employment agreement, most employees are 
considered at-will employees. Termination without warning or cause, then, 
is legally permissible, at least in the employment law context. Moreover, 
even though many family members consider employment in the family 
business to be a lifetime proposition, courts generally agree that lifetime 
employment is not a reasonable expectation. In the case of Ford v. Ford, 
for example, when a son fired his sister and mother from the family 
business, a golf course, and replaced them with his own wife and son, the 
court concluded that there was no oppression.82 In their minority 
shareholder oppression claims, the sister and mother stated that the son, 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 908 F. Supp. 2d 573, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 
 79 Plaintiff filed wrongful termination and retaliatory discharge claims. Id. at 578. 
 80 Id. at 593. 
 81 Id. A plaintiff’s chance of proving retaliatory discharge is greater if the majority shareholder 
cannot articulate a legitimate business reason for the termination. See Knights’ Piping, Inc. v. Knight, 
123 So. 3d 451, 459 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (“Benny admitted in his testimony that he unilaterally 
terminated Harold. Harold testified that Benny never gave him a reason for his termination, and Benny 
has offered no legitimate business purpose for terminating Harold.”). 
 82 878 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Riverview Golf Course, Inc . . . . a Pennsylvania 
corporation incorporated in 1961, owns and operates the Riverview Golf Course . . . . Initially the 
corporation had four shareholders, including William B. Ford (‘William’), husband of Plaintiff 
Margaret B. Ford (‘Margaret’), and father of Plaintiff Margaret L. Ford (‘Peggy’) and Defendant 
William K. Ford (‘Bill’). 
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Bill, “continued to manage the corporation for his own benefit while 
oppressing the minority shareholders.”83 Using a reasonable expectations 
framework to evaluate the claim, the court nevertheless determined that 
“[the sister’s] expectation of lifetime employment was unreasonable, absent 
an express agreement to that effect.”84 
Finally, termination-as-oppression claims are challenging to win 
because courts do not count employment rights as part of the package of 
shareholder rights. In U.S. Eagle Corp. v. Westphal (In re U.S. Eagle 
Corp.), a brother who co-owned and managed a closely held corporation 
with his sister and other relatives brought a claim of improper termination 
through minority shareholder oppression, seeking reinstatement.85 The 
brother, Scott, had been employed as secretary and vice president of the 
company starting in 2005 after a board reconfiguration and company 
restructuring.86 Despite being “Chairman of the Board and highest ranking 
officer of U.S. Eagle and Vice President and Secretary of each subsidiary,” 
however, he did not have an employment contract.87 Consequently, when 
the board was once again configured in 2012, “the new board voted to 
terminate Scott’s employment.”88 
When he was fired, Scott claimed that his sister had “orchestrated” his 
removal and that his termination “unjustifiably thwarted the understanding 
on which [he] became and has remained a shareholder.”89 Applying 
Delaware law, which offers no statutory protection for minority 
shareholders, the court remarked that Scott’s termination was lawful 
because the company had not modified Scott’s stock interest, reduced his 
shares, or violated any of his shareholder rights.90 The court explained that: 
“[A]lthough majority stockholders have fiduciary duties to minority 
stockholders qua stockholder, those duties are not implicated when the 
issue involves the rights of the minority stockholder qua employee under 
an employment contract.”91 Thus, despite the fact that the board had been 
 
 83 Id. at 898. 
 84 Id. at 903–04. The court did remark that “Peggy and Margaret do have a reasonable expectation 
to receive some benefit from their minority shares in this profitable corporation.” Id. at 904. However, 
the court left the “proper measure of this benefit” to the custodian. Id. 
 85 484 B.R. 640, 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012). 
 86 Id. at 645. 
 87 Id. at 644. 
 88 Id. at 646. 
 89 Id. Scott also claimed that his termination “was undertaken without any opportunity to be heard, 
or to discuss terms of severance.” Id. To this claim, the court responded that Scott had been an at-will 
employee. Id. at 653. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. (quoting Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 37 (Del. 1996)). 
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reconstituted specifically in order to vote for his termination and despite the 
fact that Scott had believed there to be an understanding regarding his 
continued employment, the court viewed him as ultimately nothing more 
than an employee who had been terminated, rather than a shareholder 
whose rights had been trampled on by the majority shareholder. 
Ultimately, corporate family members who have been terminated have 
little recourse in addressing adverse employment decisions. Corporate 
family members can lose income, board participation, and employment 
status and be left with neither the ability to profit from nor the ability to 
enjoy the benefits that flow from being part of a family business. 
c. Ritchie v. Rupe: Redefining “Oppressive” 
In addition to recurrent problems with the judicial application of the 
current shareholder oppression framework, protections for minority 
shareholders may be in decline because courts are starting to define 
oppressive very narrowly. The Texas Supreme Court sent this signal very 
clearly in a 2014 decision. 
In Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court overruled both the trial 
court and the appellate court to conclude that majority shareholder actions 
are oppressive only when “they abuse their authority over the corporation 
with the intent to harm the interests of one or more of the shareholders, in a 
manner that does not comport with the honest exercise of their business 
judgment, and by doing so create a serious risk of harm to the 
corporation.”92 This definition of oppressive behavior is narrow and 
demanding, and it raises the bar for plaintiffs. 
Ritchie v. Rupe entailed a classic blended-family conflict involving 
siblings and second wives, pitting a widowed second wife against her 
sister-in-law. Buddy Rupe and his sister, Paula Dennard, were two 
members of the four-person board of directors of Rupe Investment 
Corporation, a Texas closely held corporation.93 Ownership of 72% of the 
voting stock was placed in three different family trusts and apportioned 
between Buddy Rupe, Dennard, and Dennard’s children.94 Another trust, 
created by Gordon Rupethe father of Buddy Rupe and Dennardnamed 
the two children, their mother, and Dennard’s three children as 
beneficiaries. When Buddy Rupe married Ann Rupe in 1983 and they had a 
child, the couple “wanted their son to be added as a beneficiary of 
 
 92 443 S.W.3d 856, 871 (Tex. 2014). 
 93 Id. at 860. The two other directors were family friends. Id. at 860–61. The court notes that, “A 
corporation is ‘closely held’ if it has fewer than thirty-five shareholders and its stock is not publicly 
traded.” Id. at 860 n.1 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.563 (2007)). 
 94 Id. at 860–61. 
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Gordon’s Trust, but Dennard and her children refused, and this created 
some friction between [Ann] Rupe and Dennard.”95 Moreover, Ann Rupe 
stated that Dennard treated her “‘as an outsider’ from the very beginning, 
and told her that she would ‘never get any money in this family.’”96 
Subsequently, Ann Rupe began to consider pursuing legal means to 
reform Gordon Rupe’s trust in order to add her son as a beneficiary.97 
While Ann was still considering this action, Buddy died and his 18% 
interest in the corporation passed into a trust established for the benefit of 
Ann Rupe and their son, with Ann acting as trustee. Ann claimed that 
Dennard and the two other trustees “immediately became ‘hostile’ towards 
her and feared that she would sue to reform Gordon’s Trust.”98 
Consequently, Ann sought to sell the shares held in trust. 
Ann went to both of the nonfamily directors in an attempt to sell the 
shares, but both men made low offers and told her that the timing was not 
right. Ann then found an interested outside buyer, but the buyer wanted to 
meet with the directors, who refused to meet. The directors stated that, 
“because RIC would not be a party to the sale of her shares to an outside 
buyer, ‘it would be inappropriate . . . to meet with your prospects or 
otherwise participate in any activities relating to your proposed sale of 
stock.’”99 The buyer, however, wanted to “talk to the executives . . . as part 
of their due diligence.”100 Ann’s attorney advised her that “it would be 
‘incredibly difficult’ to market [her] shares without such meetings, and the 
likelihood of selling the shares was ‘zero.’”101 
Ann thereafter filed suit against Dennard and the other directors, 
alleging that they “engaged in ‘oppressive’ conduct and breached fiduciary 
duties to her.”102 At trial, the jury found in Ann Rupe’s favor and the court 
rendered judgment requiring the corporation to redeem her shares.103 The 
court of appeals affirmed this judgment and, using a test set forth in the 
1988 case Davis v. Sheerin,104 stated that the directors’ actions “defeated 
 
 95 Id. at 861. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 862. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 862–63. 
 104 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988). Davis v. Sheerin stated that the actions of majority 
shareholders are oppressive when they either (1) substantially defeat a minority shareholder’s 
reasonable expectations or (2) constitute harsh or wrongful conduct that departs from the standards of 
fair dealing. Id. at 381–82. 
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Rupe’s reasonable expectations” while also constituting a “visible 
departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on 
which each shareholder is entitled to rely.”105 
The state supreme court, however, disagreed with both lower courts, 
concluding that “neither the ‘fair dealing’ test nor the ‘reasonable 
expectations’ test sufficiently captures the Legislature’s intended meaning 
of ‘oppressive’ actions.”106 Instead, the court held that “oppressive” under 
the relevant statute meant that a majority shareholder engaged in abuse of 
authority “with the intent to harm the interests of one or more of the 
shareholders.”107 Acknowledging that “difficulty in—and sometimes even 
the impossibility of—selling one’s shares is a characteristic intrinsic to 
ownership of a closely held corporation,” the court overruled precedential 
Texas cases and took the Delaware approach; the court expected Ann Rupe 
to have bargained for “shareholder agreements that contain buy-sell, first 
refusal, or redemption provisions that reflect their mutual expectations and 
agreements.”108 
Commentators note that “Ritchie will likely result in more abusive 
conduct toward minority shareholders . . . . Given this framework, freeze-
outs and squeeze-outs will become highly attractive to majority 
shareholders.”109 Furthermore, based on the court’s reliance on the ex ante 
bargaining expectation, “the real effect of Ritchie is to . . . leave the bulk of 
family businesses and small businesses exposed, unless they each had the 
foresight, funds, and tactical nous to hire lawyers to re-create the 
‘oppression’ wheel for each new business that gets formed.”110 
The outcome of Ritchie underscores that a new group of minority 
shareholders (and a large one—those subject to Texas law) now have little 
real protection when it comes to shareholder oppression. Ritchie, as one 
commentator has also observed, may also have persuasive authority: “As 
other states continue to grapple with the contours of their own shareholder 
oppression law, they may be tempted to follow Texas and cut back on 
shareholder oppression.”111 The Ritchie ruling may, therefore, cast a long 
shadow on shareholder oppression law, leaving minority family 
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shareholders faced with an increasing number of blocked exits and narrow 
escapes. 
B. What Corporate Law Expects from People 
The protections that exist for minority shareholders in cases of 
oppression are hardly robust, and they may even be on the decline. 
However, corporate law does not see this dearth of protection as a problem 
because corporate law prioritizes individual bargaining over statutory 
buffers. Corporate law treats all corporate actors alike and offers limited 
legal protections because of the assumed power of all corporate actors to 
bargain. The absence of protections is not a blind spot. Rather, it is a strong 
signal of the bargaining expectation placed on all shareholders, including 
corporate family members. 
These bargaining norms are, in large part, premised on classic 
economic principles that drive the expected utility theory and rational actor 
model. These principles can be summarized accordingly: “[A]ll human 
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their 
utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount 
of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”112 Corporate 
decisionmakers operating in this landscape “conduct an explicit or implicit 
cost–benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method 
of achieving their goals.”113 These corporate actors are presumed to be 
unaffected by competing social norms, idiosyncratic preferences, cultural 
formations, and family dynamics. 
This expectation of freedom from competing norms and demands 
holds true for minority shareholders as well: “According to standard law 
and economics, minority shareholders in closely held corporations must 
bargain for protection against opportunism by controlling shareholders 
before investing.”114 In fact, some scholars mistakenly believe that 
bargaining is even easier and more desirable in closely held corporations. 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel state, for example: “Participants in 
closely held corporations are better informed about their legal rights and 
obligations than participants in either partnerships or public 
corporations.”115 They mention that these investors often have great 
personal wealth at stake and that, in aggregate, there are sufficient 
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inducements for these shareholders to “take care.”116 Some argue that 
because closely held corporations “contain relatively few shareholders,” the 
cost of bargaining is lowered to “manageable levels.”117 Ralph Winter goes 
further and states that, in closely held corporations, “the participants 
kn[ow] each other and ha[ve] ample opportunity to protect themselves by 
charter provisions or by side contracts.”118 
Any attempts to override an individual’s contracting autonomy, either 
by statute or judicial decree, are perceived, through this particular lens, to 
be dangerous: “One ought to tread cautiously in overriding the commercial 
arrangements of consenting adults.”119 In the rational choice model, 
therefore, bargaining and the autonomy of the contracting parties are 
indisputably paramount. Corporate family members are not, however, 
rational actors. Consequently, the rational choice model is misapplied to 
minority shareholders in closely held corporations. 
C. Family Members’ Bounded Bargaining 
Corporate law presumes corporate family members are rational 
bargainers who prioritize profit maximization and treat the family business 
solely as a source of income and revenue generation, rather than a source of 
personal satisfaction and legacy generation. This Section explains why both 
of these assumptions are flawed, expanding on the notion that “expected 
utility theory is not a good description of actual decisionmaking,”120 
particularly in the context of corporate families. 
1. Inheriting, Not Bargaining 
Looking at corporate family members from the bargaining 
perspective—how much and how well they actually bargain—is revealing. 
One phenomenon is immediately striking: observed from up close, it is 
evident that corporate family members rarely bargain for their shares. In 
any given family business, it is quite likely that the corporate family 
members involved did not engage in any bargaining whatsoever for their 
shares. In closely held corporations, shares are not generally sold or traded 
but often instead passed down through families, from parents to children 
and between branches of the family tree. Corporate shares often constitute 
much of a family’s wealth and the shares are part of intergenerational 
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wealth transfer as opposed to being part of a bargained deal between two 
parties. Accordingly, in most family businesses, there is a distinct 
possibility that a shareholder inherited her minority shares from someone 
else, most likely a parent or spouse. 
One of the most common scenarios in corporate families, as we have 
seen, is the transferal of corporate shares and ownership from a parent and 
founder to her children.121 This type of intergenerational succession 
transfers ownership of shares outside of market-based systems and 
precludes any real bargaining. The Ritchie case provides one among many 
clear examples of how children inherit shares rather than bargain for them. 
Efficient bargaining is, consequently, not always present, and often 
individuals in a corporate family come to be stakeholders, both minority 
and majority, through means that do not require or even actively disallow 
bargaining.122 
2. Bounded Rationality in Family Bargaining 
Another fallacy, in addition to the assumption that all corporate family 
members bargain to obtain their shares, is that corporate family members 
bargain at arm’s length, unencumbered by personal obligations or family 
intimacies. Critiquing the rational actor model, one scholar has remarked: 
“Both microsocial environments (family, friends, immediate neighbors) 
and macrosocial environments (associations, national culture) may affect 
an individual’s behavior.”123 To think that family ties play a part in shaping 
an individual’s bargaining ability and position would seem, to most people, 
intuitively correct. Behavioral economics, case studies, and case law all 
confirm this speculation. 
Business partners who are siblings, cousins, or parents and children 
are deeply informed and influenced by their affective ties. Corporate family 
members have a range of personal histories, longstanding allegiances, 
feelings of guilt as well as love, and unaddressed hostilities. As commonly 
happens, “sibling [partners] must deal with . . . disagreements about 
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ownership or growth and any lingering bitterness over deep-seated 
childhood rivalries.”124 For these reasons, “[s]ibling-partners’ relationships 
are among the most challenging in family businesses.”125 The problems that 
occur in all families, including those between siblings, may also be 
increased or intensified in blended families.126 Studies have found, in the 
blended family, that “disagreements often arise from conflicting loyalties 
and feelings of inequality.”127 
Corporate family members must, therefore, constantly navigate the 
overlapping of personal and professional identities and roles.128 That is to 
say, as a “hybrid identity organization,”129 a family business requires 
corporate family stakeholders to negotiate not only workplace conflict but 
also social role confusion.130 For example: 
The CEO of a family enterprise may be the son of its founder, and he may also 
be dad to several children and granddad to several grandchildren. He is likely 
the husband of a spouse who helped him build the business and raise those 
children. He may be a brother to a vice president in the company or even a 
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copresident with a sibling. In addition to being uncle to his siblings’ children, 
he may also be their boss if they work in the family enterprise.131 
Without an ability to compartmentalize, corporate family members may 
allow personal differences and conflicts to spill over into the workplace. 
From a slightly different perspective, corporate family members may 
not bargain in the way they are assumed to because of their trust and faith 
in their corporate family colleagues. The court in Brenner v. Berkowitz 
remarked: “Shareholders of close corporations are often family or close 
friends. Those persons often fail to provide for involuntary dissolution 
because they do not expect irreconcilable differences to arise.”132 Family 
members, like those entering marriage, enter into joint and collaborative 
enterprises with other family members in the spirit of optimism and 
endurance.133 Preexisting trust between the parties often means that 
corporate family members are less likely to bargain or bargain strenuously 
for their stake in the family business. 
These corporate family members are, therefore, most emphatically not 
classic rational actors. In fact, as Benjamin Means remarks: “The rational 
actor model of human behavior bears at most an approximate relation to 
reality [in the closely held corporation].”134 Contracting between these 
parties is a complicated matter, inextricably linked with the family 
framework and its characteristic qualities. The result, as Means has also 
observed: “It is no secret that minority shareholders in close corporations 
tend not to bargain for adequate protection, a problem that has been evident 
for decades.”135 
3. Bounded Self-Interest and Socioemotional Wealth 
In addition to operating from a position of bounded rationality when it 
comes to bargaining with one another, corporate family members often 
operate from a position of bounded self-interest. Law and economics 
scholars have suggested: “Self-interest is bounded in a much broader range 
of settings than conventional economics assumes, and the bound operates 
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in ways different from what the conventional understanding suggests.”136 In 
the corporate family context, family members limit their self-interest in a 
number of ways. For example, in family businesses, feelings of love, 
loyalty, or spite may overcome the individual’s self-interest in any number 
of situations.137 More broadly, however, corporate family members bind 
their own self-interest by intentionally putting other values ahead of profit 
maximization. Corporate family members are, in this way, idiosyncratic 
bargainers. 
Family members are idiosyncratic corporate actors because they start 
family businesses for a range of reasons, some deeply personal, such as to 
create a specialized workplace, to make real a shared entrepreneurial 
vision, or to pursue certain ideals through corporate activity. The corporate 
family may privilege certain competencies, cultural values, religious 
beliefs, or political philosophies in the way that they run and manage the 
corporation. Family firms and the closely held corporate form, therefore, 
allow family members to bring shared values into a workplace environment 
and shape the corporate environment through value-driven leadership.138 
Family businesses may “speak to people’s hearts in a way that other 
businesses do not.”139 
Accordingly, business scholars have recognized “that family firms are 
motivated by non-financial aspects and family owners are committed to the 
preservation of their socioemotional wealth.”140 Other types of “wealth” 
that families may consider and value include “close identification of family 
members with the firm, preservation of a positive family image, concerns 
about the company’s perpetuation, desires of family members to influence 
decisions, and care for acquaintances and community relations.”141 The 
drive to create and preserve socioemotional wealth may, then, “explain the 
family firm’s substantial responsiveness to stakeholder needs as driven by 
non-economic utilities derived by dominant family owners.”142 
One example of how family businesses pursue values outside of and 
in addition to profit maximization arose in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
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Inc.143 In that case, the Court observed how the closely held corporate 
structure allowed the Green family to run its business according to specific 
principles: “Each family member has signed a pledge to run the businesses 
in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family 
assets to support Christian ministries.”144 Moreover, the Greens’ business 
practices demonstrated a clear pursuit of noneconomic goals: “In 
accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores 
close on Sundays, even though the Greens calculate that they lose millions 
in sales annually by doing so.”145 The Court observed that the Greens also 
refused to facilitate or promote alcohol use, thereby declining to participate 
in a number of profitable transactions.146 In addition, the corporation 
contributed to Christian ministries and bought “hundreds of full-page 
newspaper ads inviting people to ‘know Jesus as Lord and Savior.’”147 
Other companies, like Blue State Coffee, announce: “[W]e were founded 
on ideals, not just for profit,”148 and support fair trade, fair wages, and 
sustainable practices regardless of whether these practices decrease the 
company’s profit margin. 
Family businesses enable families to give corporate form to their 
personal values and permit them to express those values through workplace 
culture, management practices, and organizational strategy. In addition, 
family businesses and closely held corporations allow families to pursue a 
particular entrepreneurial vision without regard to profitability. As some 
scholars argue, the closely held corporation might be an attractive and 
successful organizational form because: 
[An entrepreneur] can pursue her idea for as long as she wants and in 
whatever manner she prefers, even if the business is losing money and every 
expert in the field believes that she is pursuing a surefire failure of an idea. No 
matter how much money she loses, no one can force her to sell the business, 
hire a professional manager, or close the business down.149 
Consequently, the way in which family businesses allow corporate families 
to pursue socioemotional wealth as well as entrepreneurial vision undercuts 
the dominant stereotype of the rational bargainer that corporate law 
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assumes. Corporate family members may bargain, but they are bargaining 
for any number of benefits and types of return on their investments. 
Corporate family members are not only attenuated but also idiosyncratic 
bargainers. Consequently, the current bargaining model for these corporate 
actors requires a new theoretical basis. 
II. DISPATCHES FROM FAMILY LAW 
Minority shareholders who are corporate partners may not have a 
guaranteed form of financial protection at the termination of the corporate 
relationship, but corporate spouses do. Divorce and death trigger a range of 
rights for spouses and corporate spouses at these junctures, giving them 
automatic rights to corporate property that no other corporate partners have. 
If the corporate spouse is divorcing, she has a high likelihood of obtaining 
a fair share of corporate assets through equitable distribution. Furthermore, 
if the conflict carries through past the death of one spouse and into 
inheritance claims, the surviving corporate spouse has robust rights to 
corporate property in the form of intestate and elective share rights. This 
Part analyzes the myriad protections that are in place for corporate spouses 
and the property guarantees available to them at divorce and death, 
highlighting the ways in which family law understands bounded bargaining 
and, based on this understanding, offers protections to economically 
vulnerable parties. 
A. Divorcing the Firm, Protecting the Spouse 
As a result of the “divorce revolution”150 and the elimination of fault 
divorce in most states, divorce is an always-available option for couples in 
conflict. Moreover, many divorcing couples are also business partners. 
Married couples start businesses together or work together in family 
businesses started by one spouse’s parents. In addition, many spouses 
contribute indirectly to family businesses by playing a supporting role, 
managing the household and being a traditional corporate spouse151 who 
entertains, networks, and advises. At the time of divorce, ownership of 
corporate assets will be in question for these corporate spouses. During the 
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divorce, the court must characterize all the couple’s property, decide 
whether it is separate or marital, value that property, and then distribute it 
between the spouses. This Section explains how this process works with 
respect to corporate assets and explores the protections that are in place for 
spouses at every step of the process. 
1. Characterizing Corporate Property 
When spouses are equal business partners—sharing in corporate 
stock, management authority, and operational decisionmaking—the court’s 
job of dividing corporate assets is relatively easy. In these cases, the 
corporate assets are generally all marital property and will be divided 
equally. Ownership of shares alone, however, is not dispositive. As the 
South Carolina Supreme Court stated in a 2015 equitable-distribution case: 
“Upon dissolution of the marriage, marital property should be divided and 
distributed in a manner which fairly reflects each spouse’s contribution to 
its acquisition, regardless of who holds legal title.”152 
Consequently, even if one spouse owns all of the corporate shares, 
active partnering in the business will render the shares joint property. In 
Floyd v. Floyd, a Florida case in which the wife was “a housewife, mother, 
and business partner in the parties’ family enterprise of acquiring rental and 
commercial properties,”153 the husband held title to three of the couple’s 
rental properties despite the fact that “[j]oint bank account funds were used 
to acquire them, and meet the mortgage and tax payments on them”154 and 
the wife managed the properties. At trial, the wife testified that “she 
considered she had a 50% interest in these three properties; and the 
husband himself admitted she was entitled to some interest in the 
properties, although he denied her right to as much as a half-interest.”155 
The trial court disagreed, but on appeal the court concluded that “the wife 
established a special equity in these properties,”156 and awarded her 50% in 
the properties in recognition of her sizable contribution to the success of 
the business.157 
Similarly, in a Tennessee case, a husband a wife worked together 
running a computer repair and refurbishment company, A & F, which they 
had started together.158 The business was registered in the wife’s name 
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because the husband “did not want the new company to be involved in his 
divorce case. Also, he did not want to report any income on his federal 
income tax return which might result in income tax consequences as a 
result of his receipt of Social Security old age benefits.”159 At the time of 
divorce, the wife therefore argued that the business was a sole 
proprietorship instead of a partnership.160 
The trial court held in the wife’s favor that the business was a sole 
proprietorship.161 On appeal, however, the court reviewed evidence 
presented at trial that “both [spouses] did ‘everything’ at A & F.”162 The 
court continued: “Although the business was listed in Wife’s name on its 
license and other documents, such as a car loan application and tax returns, 
it is undisputed that both parties devoted their time, experience, and effort 
into its operation and shared in the profits.”163 This evidence led the 
appellate court to conclude that the parties had a partnership and, 
furthermore, that “domestic relations law, and not partnership law, is 
controlling in the context of the parties’ divorce.”164 The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act had “no application to the case at bar.”165 
Finally, some courts are even willing to go outside of equitable-
distribution rules and use equitable solutions to take into consideration time 
spent by spouses working together in a family business before marriage. In 
a Massachusetts case, Moriarty v. Stone, the woman started working for her 
future husband in 1975 at his family jewelry store, the Family Jewels. She 
began working as a clerk and “[w]ithin approximately one year, the wife 
was involved in virtually all aspects of the business.”166 For almost ten 
years, the two put in “tireless effort”167 and the “business prospered.”168 In 
1986, the two married, having accumulated “considerable savings and 
retirement benefits prior to their marriage.”169 
At the time of divorce, the trial court included “retirement-related 
benefits that were accrued prior to the marriage”170 in the marital estate. On 
appeal, the appellate court affirmed this ruling, stating: “[I]t would not only 
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be unfair and inequitable to disregard the parties’ respective contributions 
during their ten-year period of cohabitation but also inconsistent with the 
concept of ‘contribution.’”171 
Thus, family law, unlike corporate law, looks outside of ownership to 
contribution as a guiding principle at the termination of a partnership. 
2. Considering Individual Contributions 
Spousal contribution, then, is the dispositive factor in determining 
what percentage each spouse receives of the corporate assets subject to 
equitable distribution.172 An important protection for corporate spouses is 
that they have a claim to corporate assets not only for direct but also 
indirect contributions to the success of a business venture. If both spouses 
made direct contributions to the family business, they will likely be entitled 
to equal shares in the corporate enterprise. If only one spouse worked 
directly in the business, however, the other spouse is still entitled to 
compensation if that spouse provided support and caretaking services 
within the home—indirect contributions that allowed the working spouse to 
succeed with the business. Here, I explain how courts approach the 
question of both direct and indirect contributions to a family business and 
model ways to award shareholder rights outside of the narrow rational actor 
bargaining model. 
a. Direct Contributions: Equal Work, Equal Shares? 
Because marital property division, including the division of corporate 
assets, turns on spousal contributions, couples fight bitterly over what 
contributions each has made to their joint enterprises. Not all contributions 
are easily identified and valued, and as a result, courts must engage in fact-
intensive inquiries in order to determine what contributions each party 
made and what percentage of the marital assets each spouse should receive. 
The dispute over individual contributions was, for example, central to 
the proceedings in Moore v. Moore, a 2015 divorce case from South 
 
 171 Id. at 1344. 
 172 Id. at 1343 (“The parties’ respective contributions to the marital partnership remain the 
touchstone of an equitable division of the marital estate.”). For some representative cases, see, for 
example, Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) (“These decisions are consistent with 
the time honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners bring their financial 
resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”), Williams v. Williams, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 
(Va. Ct. App. 1987) (“The ‘equitable distribution’ statute, however, is intended to recognize a marriage 
as a partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth accumulated during and by that 
partnership based on the monetary and non-monetary contributions of each spouse.”), and Lacey v. 
Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144–45 (Wis. 1970) (“The division of the property of the divorced parties rests 
upon the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise or joint undertaking. It is literally a partnership, 
although a partnership in which contributions and equities of the partners may and do differ from 
individual case to individual case.”). 
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Carolina that went all the way to the state supreme court.173 The wife had 
opened a lighting and design business, Candelabra, just before she married 
her husband.174 The wife registered Candelabra as an S Corporation, with 
51% of the stock in her name and 49% in her husband’s name.175 The wife 
served as the company’s president and was “responsible for overseeing all 
business operations: financial forecasting and management, budgeting, 
hiring, scheduling, training, merchandising, and most importantly, selecting 
and displaying all of the products.”176 The husband held the title of vice 
president, however the trial court determined that, prior to 2005, he “was 
not actively involved in the business.”177 
In 2005, roles changed when the wife had complications with a 
pregnancy and was ordered on bed rest.178 The husband took on a greater 
role in the company, although he and his wife fought over some of his 
sales-generation strategies.179 In addition, as the business landscape 
changed and the company needed a web presence, the husband helped with 
the project, reading books on website design and branding.180 The spouses 
had differing views, however, concerning the amount of work the husband 
put into the development of the website, a project that ultimately increased 
revenue significantly and moved 80% of the company’s sales online.181 
Speaking about the husband’s participation, the wife testified at trial: “If 
Sam Moore had not been my husband . . . he would have been out [of 
Candelabra] a long time ago because he didn’t do enough to acquire even 
what a part-time position would do.”182 The husband, alternately, testified 
that he had been an integral part of the website-development team and a 
“purveyor of ideas.”183 
 
 173 779 S.E.2d 533, 537 (S.C. 2015). 
 174 Id. at 537 n.1. “Candelabra is a retail business located on Coleman Boulevard in Mount Pleasant 
that sells trendy, high-end boutique lighting, home furnishings, and home accessories in a retail 
showroom.” Id. at 537. 
 175 Id. at 538. 
 176 Id. “By all accounts, Wife is an experienced, successful businesswoman with an exceptional 
‘eye for design,’ a knack for selecting specific products that appeal to her customers and consistently 
generate sales, and the ability to create long-term, positive relationships with vendor and manufacturer 
representatives.” Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 538–39 (“Husband determined that Wife’s strategy aimed at contractor sales was too 
tedious and time-consuming, and Husband unilaterally determined that the better sales-generation 
strategy would be to pursue large corporations and multi-unit dwellings . . . .”). 
 180 Id. at 539–40. 
 181 Id. at 540. 
 182 Id. at 541. 
 183 Id. 
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The trial court was sufficiently convinced of the husband’s business 
contributions to award him half the value of the company. On appeal, the 
court remarked: 
In light of our review of the record, we find Husband vastly overstates his 
contributions . . . . [T]he record convinces us that Husband was a purveyor of 
ideas, but he left the details of putting his ideas into action to others with a 
solid work ethic, such as Wife.184 
Nonetheless, the appellate court concluded that there had been no abuse of 
discretion and affirmed the award of half the company to the husband, 
observing that, “while awarding a greater share of the marital estate to Wife 
could be justified, we see no reason to set aside the family court’s equal 
division of the marital estate.”185 The husband, then, received half of the 
corporate assets for his direct contributions, questionable as they were. 
b. Indirect Contributions: Valuing Wives186 
Even if a spouse does not contribute directly to the family business but 
instead provides indirect contributions by taking responsibility for child-
rearing and housework, the court will award a percentage of the business 
assets to that spouse. The percentage of corporate assets that the spouse 
making the indirect contributions receives varies depending on the length 
of the marriage and the extent of the indirect contributions. Unlike most 
assets, family businesses are not generally subject to the presumption of 
equal division and are counted as “special” assets.187 This special treatment 
is particularly evident if one spouse has put intensive work into building 
the business or if one spouse’s family has strong historical associations 
with the business. In these cases, distribution of these assets therefore often 
diverges significantly from the equal division standard and ranges from 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 552. 
 186 I use the term wife to denote someone who, in the traditional usage of the word, is a caretaker 
and support system for her spouse, “someone in her (or his) life who will pick up the dry cleaning, keep 
track of appointments, do the laundry, take the kids to soccer practice, get dinner on the table, manage 
the social calendar, and vacuum, dust, and scour the tub.” See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 
36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 381 (2013). This role has traditionally been fulfilled by women, but a 
person of any gender could be in the role. 
 187 In some states, there is not only a presumption but also a rule that equitable distribution means 
equal, thereby requiring courts that do not divide assets equally to provide written explanations for the 
divergence from the standard. See 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:2 
(3d ed. 2015) (observing that while, “[a] majority of states hold that the division of property between 
the parties should depend only upon the trial court’s balancing of the equitable distribution factors . . . . 
[a] respectable minority of state statutes presume that an equal division is equitable”). 
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30% to as low as 10%.188 It is particularly important for the spouse making 
indirect contributions to make the case for her role in the other spouse’s 
corporate success. 
Another divorce case that went to the state supreme court, McCulloch 
v. McCulloch turned on the question of a wife’s indirect contributions to 
her husband’s business.189 When deciding what share of the family business 
to award to the wife, the trial court concluded that Hope “made little or no 
contribution” to the family business, which had been in the husband’s 
family for multiple generations.190 Nonetheless, the trial judge stated that 
“[Hope] served as a homemaker and as such [wa]s entitled to a share of the 
marital assets.”191 The judge consequently awarded the wife 25% of the two 
family companies, leaving the rest to the husband. In justifying this award, 
the judge remarked that  
[I]t would be completely inequitable for [Hope] to receive a portion of the 
share in Microfibres, Inc. equal to [James] whose blood, sweat and tears and 
contributions by his family ha[d] been the reason for both the past success and 
what hopefully w[ould] be the future success of th[e] corporation.192 
Despite the court’s clear sense, then, that the corporate assets were a 
special asset for the husband, whose heritage and hard work had built the 
companies, the wife received a quarter of the value of the companies for 
the support that she provided to her husband. 
Recognizing this support role very explicitly, the trial judge in Sykes 
v. Sykes, a 2014 case from New York, awarded the wife 30% of the value 
 
 188 Family businesses are generally considered “special assets” and exempt from the presumption 
of equal division.  
Although the law often favors a distribution of marital assets that is as equal as possible, 
especially in a marriage of a fairly long duration such as this, it cannot be said that a fifty-fifty 
division of a titled spouse’s business is the standard irrespective of the contribution by the non-
titled spouse.  
  Contrary to what defendant argues, case law has long confirmed that business assets are 
to be treated differently from other assets for purposes of equitable distribution. 
Sykes v. Sykes, 313085/2010, 2014 WL 1797010, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2014); see also Ron 
Tweel & Elizabeth Coughter, Deviations from a 50/50 Split of Marital Assets in Equitable Distribution, 
MICHIEHAMLETT, http://www.michiehamlett.com/tweel-coughter-deviations-equitable-distribution/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PLX-X5WB] (“Therefore, the proponent for an unequal and greater award of a 
family business will succeed if there is proof of greater efforts made by the proponent in actually 
creating and pursuing the business enterprise. This unequal award is particularly true when the other 
non-employee spouse is active at home or in other efforts and has little to do with the business 
enterprise.”). 
 189 69 A.3d 810, 818 (R.I. 2013). 
 190 Id. (concluding “[Hope] ha[d] in no significant way done anything to contribute towards the 
acquisition, preservation or appreciation of the corporate assets”). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
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of her husband’s hedge fund.193 Substantial trial time went toward 
establishing the extent of the wife’s contributions, and the husband “took 
the position that even though defendant did not work outside the home and 
was very much a ‘stay-at-home mom,’ her contributions on the domestic 
front were ultimately quite limited.”194 He argued that his wife did not 
perform housework, did not cook or clean, and did not even perform the 
task of “removing the plastic from the dry cleaning.”195 The wife, he 
argued, “outsourced most domestic chores”196 and was reliant on staff to 
perform most household chores as well as childcare.197 The husband also 
presented evidence that the wife entertained infrequently and failed, 
therefore, to take on the role of “corporate spouse.”198 
The court nevertheless concluded that she had contributed to her 
husband’s success in context-appropriate ways. The court observed that 
social norms prescribed that the wife employ a full staff, delegate a range 
of menial chores, and hire full-time help for childcare purposes.199 
Referencing household-management responsibilities taken on by women 
running great estates, the court remarked: 
Like a latter-day Cora Crawley, Countess of Grantham, who unquestionably 
runs the household at Downton Abbey despite the presence of Mr. Carson, 
Mrs. Hughes, Mrs. Patmore and Daisy, defendant unquestionably ran the 
Sykes household in New York, East Hampton and Paris despite the presence 
of cooks, personal assistants and the person who unsheathed the dry 
cleaning.200 
The important thing, the court observed, was that she had been 
available to her husband, had provided him with the home he desired and 
the support he needed to be successful in his work life.201 As the wife 
testified, their agreement was that it was her job “to make sure when he 
came home he could be rejuvenated and go back out and slay the dragons 
on Wall Street.”202 These were, then, the indirect contributions that the 
court recognized and rewarded. 
 
 193 313085/2010, 2014 WL 1797010. 
 194 Id. at *6. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at *6–7. 
 197 Id. at *7. 
 198 Id. at *6. 
 199 Id. at *7. 
 200 Id. at *7–8. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at *7. 
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Consequently, unlike a minority shareholder who can be completely 
barred from any relief, spouses generally have a guaranteed right to a 
certain percentage of corporate assets. The exact percentage varies 
according to contribution; however, even with no direct contribution and no 
title ownership, family law offers certain protections and a spouse is 
generally entitled to a share of the assets. 
B. Surviving Spouses Inherit the Firm 
Inheritance law, like equitable-distribution rules, protects spouses 
from financial distress when one spouse dies by giving the other spouse a 
claim to jointly acquired and maintained property. Surviving spouses have 
strong property rights through intestacy law should the spouse die without a 
valid will or should a court determine that a will is invalid.203 Moreover, if 
one spouse tries to disinherit the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse 
may elect to take the forced spousal share and automatically receive a 
portion of the decedent’s estate.204 Intestacy and forced share rights 
underscore that, unlike a minority corporate shareholder, a surviving 
corporate spouse has a strong set of rights at the end of the corporate 
relationship, even if the relationship was fraught with conflict. This Section 
discusses how rights accorded to surviving spouses work to protect them in 
the face of financial insecurity, personal conflict, and adverse actions taken 
by the other spousein other words, in the face of oppressive behavior. 
1. Surviving Spouses Win by Default 
Intestacy rules are default rules meant to approximate the estate plan 
that most decedents would have chosen if they had been testate. The 
assumption is overwhelmingly that deceased spouses would want to 
provide for their surviving spouses (regardless of the truth of that 
assumption in specific cases). Accordingly, in all states, intestacy rules 
provide that a surviving spouse is entitled to a share of a decedent’s estate 
if he dies without a will or if a will is ruled invalid. The percentage of the 
estate going to the surviving spouse depends on the jurisdiction.205 In New 
York, for example, a surviving spouse would receive everything if there 
 
 203 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 70–71 (9th ed. 2013). 
 204 Id. at 512–20. 
 205 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 75 (1991). A revised version of 
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was passed in 1990, and it adjusts the percentage of a 
surviving spouse’s benefits according to the length of the couple’s marriage, reaching a maximum of 
50% after fifteen years. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2 cmt. at 61 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1990). Nine states 
have adopted the 1990 Revision of Article II in its entirety, and numerous other states have adopted the 
UPC in an incomplete form. LEGAL INFO. INST., Uniform Probate Code, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate [https://perma.cc/63AP-F4ZY]. 
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were no children but only $50,000 of intestate property if there were 
descendants of any kind.206 In Virginia, the spouse would inherit everything 
in the absence of children as well but also everything if the couple had 
children.207 The surviving spouse’s share would only be diminished if the 
decedent had children from a previous relationship, and then the surviving 
spouse’s share would decrease to one-third of the estate.208 
If, for example, one spouse died without leaving a will, the surviving 
spouse would receive all the deceased spouse’s shares of the business if the 
couple had no children. Even if they had children, or the deceased spouse 
had children from a previous marriage, the surviving spouse would receive 
a certain number of shares. Consequently, the surviving spouse could 
quickly go from being minority shareholder to majority shareholder in a 
family business, able to assert voice and leadership, potentially reshaping 
the company through her new majority ownership. A surviving corporate 
spouse might, therefore, find herself in an improved business position after 
inheriting additional shares through intestacy. The same would be true even 
if the decedent spouse had a will but a court determined that it was invalid 
due, for example, to a problem with the will formalities or a successful 
claim of undue influence. 
Furthermore, a surviving spouse has a claim to her intestate share of 
the estate even if the spouses had been experiencing marital discord or 
were not living together at the time of spouse’s death. Marital conflict, 
even after having filed for divorce, does not change a surviving spouse’s 
intestate rights at all. The only claim that an estate can bring to bar a 
surviving spouse from receiving her intestacy share is abandonment.209 
Subsequently, what constitutes abandonment is a question that courts 
address with some frequency and have, generally, answered by setting a 
high threshold. For example, a New York appellate court upheld a wife’s 
right to her elective share even though the wife had lived apart from her 
husband for twenty-three years.210 Affirming this right, the court wrote:  
 
 206 N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 2011). 
 207 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-200 (2012). 
 208 Id. 
 209 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 519; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64. 2-308 
(2016). Other states have similar statutory provisions. For some representative cases, see Boudreau v. 
Slaton, 9 So. 3d 495, 499–500 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (where a spouse dies before a final entry of 
divorce, the divorce action abates and the surviving spouse can still take his or her elective share), and 
Purce v. Patterson, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Va. 2008) (abandonment must continue until death of the 
spouse). 
 210 In re Duplessis, 123 A.D.3d 927, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“In 1987, Jennie left the marital 
home, and she lived separately from the decedent until the decedent’s death in 2010.”). 
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[M]ore must be shown than a mere departure from the marital abode and a 
consequent living separate and apart . . . . [O]ne who seeks to impose such a 
forfeiture must, in addition, establish . . . that the abandonment was unjustified 
and without the consent of the other spouse.211 
One New York court even lamented the frequency with which a surviving 
spouse who had been separated from the deceased spouse received an 
intestate distribution, stating: “Such obviously unjust results are frequent 
and commonplace in these posthumous matrimonial trials in this Court.”212 
The majority of state courts have, however, reaffirmed the traditional 
standard thereby enabling the surviving spouse to take her share of the 
estate even in the midst of marital conflict.213 
In fact, only in the rarest of circumstances does a court bar the spouse 
from intestate rights. In a 2012 case from the Surrogate’s Court in New 
York, In re Estate of Hama, the question of abandonment arose in the 
context of a wife’s right to her intestate share of the husband’s estate, 
which was worth approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death and 
included the value of his privately owned design business.214 The husband 
and wife had worked together at the husband’s business before getting 
married in 2006.215 However, based on testimony from the husband’s 
accountant, the court remarked that “[t]he reason for the marriage may or 
may not have been romantic” and may have been instead a way to avoid a 
tax burden for the decedent.216 Adding weight to the speculation, the 
husband and his spouse had an open relationship, and she registered in 
marriage in Japan with another man.217 Because of the instrumental nature 
of the marriage, and what looked like a form of benefits fraud, the court 
 
 211 Id. at 928. 
 212 In re Lamos’ Estate, 313 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782–83 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1970) (“[T]he parties had 
probably separated by mutual consent and [the wife] seemed neither to have desired or looked to her 
husband for support.”). 
 213 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 519 (“In a minority of states, the elective share 
is denied to a surviving spouse who abandoned or refused to support the deceased spouse.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Naim D. Bulbulia & Jonathan W. Wolfe, Dying to Get a Divorce?: Why Interim Wills 
Are Essential for Divorcing Clients, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newslet
ter_home/dyingtodivorce.html [https://perma.cc/HXG3-W5VR] (“[M]ost states’ Intestacy Statutes do 
not explicitly exclude spouses who have separated or are in the process of divorcing, and there is little 
precedent elucidating how such a situation would be resolved.”). 
 214 957 N.Y.S.2d 583, 584–86 (N.Y. Sur. Court 2012). 
 215 Id. at 585. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 586. 
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concluded that the wife had “forfeited the rights with respect to his estate 
that would otherwise accrue to her as his surviving spouse.”218 
Absent circumstances that call into question the validity of the entire 
marriage, all other conflicts are generally seen as ordinary and spousal 
rights to intestate property, including corporate assets, are relatively 
inviolable. Based on status granted by relationship rather than power 
accorded through bargaining, surviving spouses are entitled to property 
rights even when the decedent spouse failed to make any such property 
provisions. 
2. Elective Rights and Forced Sharing 
If the decedent spouse does have a will but either leaves the surviving 
spouse out of it entirely or leaves her with minimal assets, the surviving 
spouse still has rights to the decedent’s estate, including corporate assets, 
through what is called either the elective or forced spousal share.219 The 
share is generally equal to one-third of the estate but, as with intestacy 
rights, the rules vary by state.220 In New York, if a surviving spouse takes 
her elective share, she will receive all of the estate assets if the decedent’s 
assets consisted of $50,000 or less.221 If the decedent’s assets were more 
than $50,000, then the surviving spouse is entitled to the greater of $50,000 
or one-third of the estate assets.222 In Virginia, the surviving spouse 
receives one-half of the decedent’s estate as her elective share if the 
decedent left no surviving descendants and one-third if the decedent left 
surviving children or their descendants.223 The Uniform Probate Code, 
basing its rule explicitly on the economic partnership theory of marriage, 
provides that the surviving spouse receive up to half of the estate but also 
suggests conditioning the amount on the length of marriage.224 
 
 218 Id. at 591. 
 219 Both terms are used to describe this share: it is elective from the spouse’s perspective and 
forced from the estate’s. 
 220 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 513. 
 221 N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 2011). 
 222 Id. 
 223 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-304 (2016). 
 224 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -203 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). When the drafters of the 
UPC changed the elective share from one-third of a decedent’s estate to one-half for marriages of a 
requisite length, they explained changes thusly: “The elective share of the surviving spouse was 
fundamentally revised . . . . to bring elective-share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage 
as an economic partnership. The economic partnership theory of marriage is already implemented under 
the equitable distribution system.” UNIFORM L. COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
pt. 2, at 1 (Jan. 12, 2008), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/
electiveshare_technicalamend_jan08.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G9G-S4PB]. 
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Similar to intestacy disputes, relatives or the decedent’s estate will 
sometimes try to bar the surviving spouse from receiving the elective share 
through claims of disqualification and abandonment. In In re Estate of 
Post, the estate tried to bar a surviving spouse from her elective share on 
the grounds that “prior to decedent’s death, he and plaintiff had lived apart 
‘under circumstances which would have given rise to a cause of action for 
divorce or nullity of marriage.’”225 The estate claimed that the wife “had 
been a habitual alcoholic,” that the “decedent had become frustrated by 
plaintiff’s demands for more money,” that the spouses “had ceased having 
marital relations” almost ten years prior to the husband’s death, and that the 
wife “had refused to take decedent to a hospital while he was allegedly 
demonstrating symptoms of a heart attack.”226 The court, however, found 
that there was insufficient credible evidence to support the estate’s claims 
of abandonment and concluded that these claims did not preclude the wife 
from receiving her elective share.227 Many abandonment claims, especially 
constructive abandonment claims, fail and the surviving spouse’s rights 
prevail. 
More often, conflicts over the elective share turn on what assets are 
included in the estate. Some states statutorily define what assets go into the 
estate for purposes of calculating the elective share, including nonprobate 
as well as probate assets.228 Classic cases have addressed the question of 
whether life insurance proceeds, funds in pay-on-death accounts, and trust 
assets are includable in the estate. The composite of all the includable 
assets is called the augmented estate. With respect to corporate family 
shares, the augmented-estate question is acutely relevant because corporate 
shares are often held in trust, and questions arise about whether these assets 
count for the purposes of the elective share. 
In Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, for example, the husband’s 
wealth consisted of shares in three separate closely held family 
businesses.229 His assets included a large working farm (which he owned 
completely), a coal company (in which he had a minority interest), and a 
steel supply company (in which he was the majority owner and his wife 
and son had small minority interests).230 In addition to his ownership 
 
 225 659 A.2d 500, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (footnote omitted) (quoting N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 3B:8-1 (1982)). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. The wife did not, however, receive her elective share for other reasons concerning the 
valuation and inclusion of various trust interests. 
 228 See, for example, Iowa’s statute, IOWA CODE § 633.238 (2017). 
 229 379 S.E.2d 752, 754 (W. Va. 1989). 
 230 Id. 
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interests, the husband also “worked primarily in a management capacity, 
overseeing the day-to-day operation of these three businesses.”231 
Six years before his death, the husband transferred his shares in these 
companies into a trust, with a bank as trustee.232 When the husband 
subsequently died, the will entitled the wife “to receive tangible personal 
property valued at $12,750 and jointly owned assets valued at $7,250.”233 
The probate estate was valued at approximately $158,000 while the trust 
assets had a purported value of nearly $1.4 million. The wife, not 
surprisingly, renounced her rights to take from the will and elected instead 
to take her statutory elective share.234 
The question then arose as to whether or not the corporate shares in 
trust constituted part of the augmented estate. The court, restating the 
policy objectives of the legislature, wrote: “[Election] attempts to protect a 
surviving spouse against the possibility of disinheritance”; the court also 
recognized, however, that “numerous” forms of nonprobate transfer could 
easily be used to “diminish a surviving spouse’s elective share.”235 The 
court concluded that, although the husband had transferred his shares into 
the trust, “he did not part with the incidents of ownership. Instead, Mr. 
Johnson was free to manage his business interests just as he had always 
done.”236 The transfer was “illusory” in the sense that he retained 
substantial if not entire dominion and control over the assets. 
Consequently, the assets in trust were part of the decedent’s augmented 
probate estate and subject to the elective share and the surviving spouse 
received her portion of the shares in trust.237 
Ultimately, there is only one secure way to safeguard corporate shares 
from a spouse: prenuptial agreement. In In re Estate of Sorenson-Peters, 
the wife was the owner of a family business and married to her third 
husband.238 When the wife died three years into this marriage in a plane 
crash, her estate tried to disqualify the husband from asserting his right to 
the spousal share on the grounds that the marriage was failing. The estate 
brought forth witnesses who “testified the decedent described [her 
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 232 Id. at 755. 
 233 Id. at 756. 
 234 Id. at 755–56. 
 235 Id. at 756. 
 236 Id. at 761. The court analyzed the question using the traditional “illusory transfer” test as well as 
the intent to defraud and the present donative intent tests. Id. at 757–59. Ultimately, the court adopted a 
“flexible standard” that allowed the taking “into account all of the circumstances and . . . equities on 
each side.” Id. at 759 (quoting Davis v. KB & T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45, 50 (W. Va. 1983)). 
 237 Id. at 762. 
 238 No. 11-1547, 2012 WL 5355712, at *2−3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012). 
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husband] as lazy, with no work ethic . . . using her for her income.”239 The 
court found the testimony unconvincing240 and, accordingly, the husband 
received his elective portion of the estate. 
Not subject to the husband’s elective share, however, were the 
corporate assets because of a prenuptial agreement: “This was the third 
marriage for both parties, and prior to the marriage, [the husband] signed a 
prenuptial agreement, disclaiming any interest or right in the decedent’s 
family’s business.”241 Without any further intervention from the court or the 
parties, the corporate assets, worth approximately $1 million, went as 
directed by the prenuptial agreement to the decedent’s children from 
previous marriages.242 Contracting out of the rules governing the elective 
share is, therefore, not only possible but also the best way to ensure that a 
surviving spouse (or ex-spouse) will not have access to shares in a family 
business.243 
Absent a prenuptial agreementa limited bargaining opportunity for 
soon-to-be spousesthe rights of the surviving spouse are paramount, 
making disinheritance impossible and asset sheltering extremely difficult. 
These default, status-based property rights that spouses have at death, like 
at divorce, underscore that there are alternate theories and methods for 
allocating rights to family business stakeholders. 
C. Bargaining in the Shadow of Marriage 
The obvious question, then, iswhy marriage is different? Why do 
corporate spouses receive greater protections than any other corporate 
partners? That marriage and marriage partners are treated differently may 
not surprise anyone; moreover, this privileged treatment may seem 
intuitively correct to some. After all, spouses share a certain type of 
intimacy, they endure more and different things than other partners, and 
they are expected to share in ways that business partners do not necessarily 
share. The reason that spouses receive greater protections than any other 
 
 239 Id. at *3. 
 240 The estate also tried to bar the husband from his share in the damages recovered from the 
wrongful death suit, while also barring the estate’s portion of the same damages from being subject to 
the husband’s elective share. Id. at *5. The court concluded, however, that wrongful death proceeds 
were counted as personal property under intestacy statutes in the Iowa Code and were, therefore, subject 
to the intestate share. Id. at *7. The damages were divided between the children, the husband, and the 
estate. Id. 
 241 Id. at *3. 
 242 Id. (“The children received the decedent’s interest in the family corporation totaling 
$928,500 . . . .”). 
 243 This presents an interesting contrast with Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, in which the court discounted 
an agreement made between spouses during an intact marriage. 929 N.E.2d 955, 969 (Mass. 2010). 
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partners takes these assumptions into account indirectly, but the primary 
reason has to do with bargaining. This Section discusses marital bargains 
and bargaining in order to explain why spouses receive the legal treatment 
that they do at relationship termination. Understanding the way in which 
spousal bargaining leads to increased shareholder protections, 
subsequently, provides a fresh perspective through which to understand 
why certain corporate family members should also receive enhanced 
protections. 
1. Excavating the Original Marital Bargain 
Before any direct bargaining was routinely allowed between 
spousesprior to spouses considering the option of explicit bargaining 
about marriage rolesthe contours of a marital bargain were already 
present. Marriage law has been defined historically by a standard bargain, 
grounded in coverture and premised on a husband’s duty of support and a 
wife’s duty to obey and care for her husband. In this classic bargain, as 
described by Sir William Blackstone, the “legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband.”244 Women traded obedience and household labor 
for protection and provisioning. The “precise contours of this marital 
bargain,” also “evolved over time,”245 impacted by new developments such 
as the right of married women to own property.246 Nevertheless, the 
traditional bargain remained one of support for care work, domestic work, 
and sexual relations. 
This historical version of the marital bargain meant that law expected 
no bargaining from spouses within marriage not only because women had 
no bargaining power but also because there was an implicit marital bargain 
that women were seen as consenting to at the moment of marriage.247 
Family wealth law, outside of the parental bargaining over marriage 
settlements in the weeks leading up to a marriage, never expected spouses 
to explicitly bargain about earnings and property because a default template 
 
 244 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58. 
 245 Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 
 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 81 (2016). 
 246 See Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married 
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEM. 165 (2014). 
 247 Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 
235 (2011) (“Not only could a married woman not make a contract with her husband, but also her 
ability to bargain with the outside world was severely restricted by coverture, in which rights over her 
property and the wages she had earned vested in her husband.”). See generally Allison Anna Tait, 
Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1269 (2015) (courts presumed an exchange as well as a 
unity between spouses and declined, as a general rule, to support a keeping of accounts between 
spouses). 
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was already assumed to be present and operative, embedded within 
coverture rules. 
During the last decades of the twentieth century, the marital bargain 
began to transform from a relationship of support to one of economic 
partnership. No-fault divorce was the spur because this new regulatory 
regime necessitated a new theory of asset distribution at divorceone not 
premised on faultand equitable distribution became the new standard 
bearer. Equitable distribution helped provision divorcing housewives who 
were vulnerable because of the traditional income and wealth asymmetries 
that the structure of marriage produced. Courts stressed a couple’s 
economic partnership in order to reach equal asset division, and, slowly but 
surely, the legal discourse around marriage settled on the idea of economic 
partnership.248 Equitable distribution and economic partnership rewrote the 
marital bargainor, at the very least, changed the terms of discourse. 
Nevertheless, the default marital bargain was still traceable. Even within 
the framework of economic partnership, marriage still entailed an exchange 
of household work and domestic contributions for the guarantee of 
financial remuneration in the event of divorce. 
Whether the marital bargain is premised on older theories of support 
or newer ones of partnership, then, the result is the same: marriage law 
contains a default bargain that all other bargains, including pre- and 
postnuptial agreements, map over or onto. This implicitly sets forth ex ante 
limits, constructing the parameters of possibility for bargaining spouses. 
Moreover, because this implicit bargain is always present at the root of the 
legal relationship, spouses are not presumed either to have or to need full 
contractual autonomy. Robust bargaining autonomy is not considered 
desirable in the marital context and, for similar reasons, would be just as 
undesirable in the context of corporate family members. 
2. The Unique Nature of Spousal Bargaining 
A default marital bargain is in place, then, ordering legal 
understandings and expectation of marriage like the invisible hand, guiding 
individual and collective choices. Nevertheless, spouses also bargain on 
their own to bring clarity to shadow spots in the original bargain or to 
circumvent the default rules. In fact, most spouses are active bargainers 
who bargain informally on a regular basis. 
Spouses bargain daily over the demands of running a household, 
keeping up with social obligations, and negotiating career paths. Someone 
has to pay the cable bill, buy groceries, and make appointments with the 
 
 248 Id. at 1250–60. 
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dentist and doctor.249 One spouse’s new job may involve negotiating a 
move with the other spouse, who may be forced not only to relocate but 
also to change jobs.250 Childcare, in particular, routinely requires 
scheduling flexibility and negotiation. Spouses, therefore, bargain to meet 
the immediate demands of a shared life.251 
Couples also bargain formally when entering into and exiting from 
marriage. Antenuptial agreements have become increasingly routine, 
especially among high-wealth couples, and couples bargain over anything 
and everything in these agreements.252 Most commonly, couples bargain 
before marriage about how certain assets will be characterized if they 
divorce, usually exempting specific assets from becoming marital 
property.253 Frequently, couples bargain over the elective share as well, 
with the wife giving up her right to the elective share in return for a 
guaranteed financial benefit. But couples also bargain over fidelity, 
sometimes inserting “bad boy” clauses that bring penalties. Couples 
stipulate financial rewards that will flow to the wife upon the birth of 
children. And, if there is an earning asymmetry, the couple might specify a 
regular financial allotment for the nonearning spouse. Couples also bargain 
specifically to opt out of the conventional marital bargain: to rewrite gender 
roles, change implicit marital expectations, create alternative families, and 
clarify personalized family designs.254 Couples also bargain at relationship 
exit over the terms of a divorce.255 Couples bargain over who retains what 
assets, spousal maintenance, and childor even petcustody terms. 
The fact that spouses bargain regularly and even vigorously does not, 
however, mean that they are free from competing desires and bounded self-
 
 249 See generally ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003); 
Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1414 (2015) (detailing the ways in which women take 
on household work even when employed in the paid labor market, thereby taking on an additional 
“second shift” of work). 
 250 See Beth A. Livingston, Bargaining Behind the Scenes: Spousal Negotiation, Labor, and Work–
Family Burnout, 40 J. MGMT 949 (2014). 
 251 See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING 
POWER 37–65 (1995). 
 252 Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and 
How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 146 (1998). 
 253 WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMILY LAW 108 (6th ed. 2013) (“In premarital agreements, parties 
often give up . . . their right to an elective share.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 254 See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE 
ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015); MAHONY, supra note 251; see also Case, supra note 247, at 251 
(bargaining may “tend to benefit those in couples who have reached and seek enforcement of a bargain 
that departs from traditional gender roles”). 
 255 For an analysis of how gender impacts divorce negotiations, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & 
Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 
26 LAW & INEQ. 109 (2008). 
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interest. Spouses may, in fact, be the most ubiquitous example of why the 
rational actor model is flawed: even though they bargain frequently, they 
are compelled by innumerable and varied motives, attachments, 
animosities, and desired outcomes. Because of the unique intimacy spouses 
share and precisely because of the complicated psychology of marriage, 
marriage law has built in protections for bargaining spouses.256 Marriage 
law has traditionally presumed that spouses are idiosyncratic bargainers, 
understood to suffer from overly bounded rationality because their desired 
outcomes are formed by such varied and complex motivations. Unlike in 
the corporate context, personal knowledge is not thought to produce 
bargaining power. Instead, spouses are considered unlikely to bargain 
effectively or fairly because the opportunities for spouses to deploy 
psychological and emotional weaponry are too many and the chance of 
manipulation too great.257 
The rule, therefore, has traditionally been: “Courts in this country 
have generally been closed to those who seek judicial enforcement of 
bargains or judicial resolution of disputes in an ongoing marriage.”258 
Family law allows bargaining on the margins of marriage—antenuptial and 
divorce agreements are acceptable—however bargaining within marriage is 
either automatically disallowed or scrutinized with supreme care.259 This 
rule may, in many ways, downplay or ignore the frequent and successful 
bargaining in which spouses engage. Nevertheless, the rule correctly 
recognizes that all individuals, whether spouses or not, are formed by and 
follow personal desires in bargaining and that when the bargaining parties 
are intimately connected, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to 
compartmentalize roles and avoid the professional becoming personal. 
Accordingly, corporate spouses benefit from legal protections when 
their relationships terminate because legal norms and rules construct 
 
 256 Family law might also be seen, from a less optimistic point of view, to discourage marital 
bargaining because law continues to think in terms of the fiction of marital unity and consequently 
disallows either the appearance or the reality of separate interests within marriage. 
 257 Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 962−63 (Mass. 2010) (“A marital agreement stands on 
a different footing from both a premarital and a separation agreement. Before marriage, the parties have 
greater freedom to reject an unsatisfactory premarital contract. A separation agreement, in turn, is 
negotiated when a marriage has failed and the spouses ‘intend a permanent separation or marital 
dissolution.’ . . .  The circumstances surrounding marital agreements in contrast are ‘pregnant with the 
opportunity for one party to use the threat of dissolution “to bargain themselves into positions of 
advantage.”’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
§ 7.01(1)(c) (Am. Law Inst. 2002); then quoting Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999))). 
 258 Case, supra note 247, at 225. 
 259 Id. at 251. 
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corporate spouses as bounded bargainers who will not always be able to 
fully or rationally bargain for their own protections. 
III. BUILDING CORPORATE FAMILY LAW 
Understanding that corporate family members do not bargain in the 
way that corporate law expects them to and are, in fact, more akin to 
corporate spouses who are bounded bargainers, the subsequent question is 
how to protect these corporate actors. This Part suggests paths to begin 
building a new corporate family law that will benefit all corporate family 
members. To do so, I suggest increasing legal and financial protections for 
minority shareholders in closely held corporations that are owned and run 
by families.260 Closely held corporations are defined in a number of ways, 
usually by number of shareholders, but they can easily be defined by family 
participation as well. A central feature of these corporations, indeed, is that 
they are usually family controlled. Reform could be targeted, then, at 
family-owned, closely held corporations, and this descriptive requirement 
could be written into any statutory solution.261 The following Sections 
propose solutions and reforms based both on family law jurisprudence and 
an enhanced understanding of the needs of corporate family members. 
A. Bringing Family Law into Corporate Law 
A first place to look for solutions is divorce and inheritance law. 
Many of those rules have relevance in the corporate arena and can provide 
useful models for corporate reform. The solutions that follow derive from 
family law—both divorce and inheritance law—and braid together rules 
from family and corporate law in order to better protect family members 
from corporate oppression by improving what happens for these individuals 
at corporate exit. 
1. Taking Lessons from Divorce Law 
Divorce law is, perhaps, the definitive source for rules governing 
relationship exit. Divorce courts possess great fluency in managing 
 
 260 It is likely that these protections should be extended to family members in various other 
organizational forms, like partnerships and LLCs. I reserve that discussion, however, for another time. 
 261 In the instances in which the shareholders in a closely held corporation are not family members, 
they are usually friends who have started a business together or who have decided to go in on a business 
venture together. As I mention supra note 25, corporate friends might also and perhaps should also 
benefit from these same protections, based on the notion of bounded bargaining. Corporate friends, like 
corporate family members, are likely bounded bargainers. Nevertheless, the concept of corporate 
friends requires a different and new discussion about line drawing and invites debate over what and 
who are friends. It is for this same reason that inheritance law never includes friends in intestacy laws or 
anti-lapse laws. Friends may be forever, but they are also notoriously difficult to define and, unlike 
family, even more difficult to keep. 
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relationship termination and the allocation of assets that accompanies it. 
This Section discusses two ways in which corporate law can look to family 
law—in providing buyout as a remedy and in eliminating discounts when 
they penalize the minority shareholder—to improve protections for 
corporate family members. 
a. A Judicial Preference for Buyout 
One reform that is already included in the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act is to require fair-value buyout.262 The Model Act states: 
“In a proceeding . . . to dissolve a corporation, the corporation may elect or, 
if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares 
owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares.”263 In 
this way, dissolution is not the sole remedy available to a minority 
shareholder, and the relationship exit can be executed with the least harm to 
the company. Currently, a majority of states allow buyout as a remedy; 
however, there are notable exceptions including Delaware and Virginia. 
Consequently, buyout as a remedy is not guaranteed and great debate still 
exists concerning whether or not a mandatory buyout should be available to 
minority shareholders. 
Looking to divorce law, some form of buyout of shares is the most 
common way to deal with the division of corporate shares. The rules 
concerning corporate stock distribution at divorce are that stock in a closely 
held family corporation can be distributed by the court in a divorce 
proceeding in several ways, “including division of the stock, awarding 
offsetting property, or cash payments over time.”264 The majority of courts 
underscore that the first option, division of stock, is the least preferable 
method of distribution because it necessitates a continued working 
relationship between spouses.265 The other two solutions, which essentially 
constitute a buyout, are the more frequent result. 
 
 262 At present, a small number of statesincluding Alaska, California, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, and North Dakotainclude fair value language in their statutes. See Matheson & Maler, 
supra note 37, at 671; Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 309–10 
(noting a number of states have “fair value” statutes but that “fair value” is not well defined). 
 263 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2002). 
 264 Weston v. Weston 773 P.2d 408, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Utah rule is typical of other 
states as well. 
 265 See, e.g., Frandsen v. Frandsen, 564 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Haw. 1977); Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 
69 (Utah 1981); Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979); Wetzel v. Wetzel, 150 N.W.2d 482, 485 
(Wis. 1967). “We agree that, whenever possible, continued joint ownership by divorced spouses of 
closely held corporate stock should be avoided, and acknowledge with approval those cases cited by the 
defendant which set forth the rationale for that principle.” Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 
1983). Nevertheless, in Savage v. Savage, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that because the varying 
valuations were all credible and because “any cash distribution risked doing substantial injustice to one 
party . . . . in-kind division of Savage stock was a proper solution.” Id. 
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Courts avoid division of stock in order to facilitate a clean break 
between the parties. In Smith v. Smith,266 for example, “[d]espite assigning 
a value to [two companies] . . . the court concluded that it could not 
determine an ‘accurate accrual value of the stock’ in either corporation and 
provided that the stock holdings in these corporations be divided equally 
between the parties.”267 On appeal, both spouses contended that the trial 
court had erred by not providing a different exit option.268 The state 
supreme court agreed: “We cannot expect divorced parties to continue a 
business relationship that will optimize resources and profits”; it was, the 
court suggested, “particularly important to avoid creating situations where 
the divorced parties remain in joint management of the income producing 
property.”269 
Courts also avoid division of shares in order to avoid making one 
spouse into a minority shareholder. In McCulloch v. McCulloch,270 the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred by 
failing to value the corporate shares and subsequently awarding the wife 
25% of the shares in the family businesses. On appeal, the state supreme 
court observed that assigning stock to the wife rather than some other form 
of compensation was incorrect.271 The court reasoned that, by not placing 
value on the companies before assigning the shares, the wife’s minority 
share would “likely not be the equivalent of 25 percent of the total value of 
the company.”272 Furthermore, the court observed that the “assignment of 
stock in a closely held corporation, which makes one spouse a minority 
shareholder, is generally disfavored and should be avoided whenever 
possible.”273 
The question, then, in the corporate context is whether a buyout 
should be mandatory or just available as a judicial remedy. Some scholars 
have proposed that because of the peculiar and precarious position of a 
minority shareholder, there should be a statutorily guaranteed buyout.274 
These scholars contend that “both involuntary dissolution and its 
 
 266 690 A.2d 970 (Me. 1997). 
 267 Id. at 971. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. (quoting Berry v. Berry, 658 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Me. 1995)). 
 270 69 A.3d 810, 818 (R.I. 2013). 
 271 Id. at 822. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. The state supreme court remanded the case for further inquiry. Id. at 830 (“[The trial justice] 
should have placed a value on the portions of the two entities that he assigned to each party to ensure 
that his distribution of the marital estate was truly equitable.”). Id. 
 274 See Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 308–10 (discussing the 
fair-buyout remedy). 
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alternatives are costly and ineffectual and that considerations of equity and 
efficiency justify permitting the minority to withdraw its investment for 
any reason.”275 A mandatory buyout, however, may prove to be unfair to 
the majority shareholder, who could be forced to keep an inflated asset base 
in order to execute a buyout at any time. Moreover, this guarantee might 
impact the company’s ability to obtain credit or give the minority 
shareholder an unfair bargaining chip.276 The third option, and the middle 
ground, is to “aggressively encourag[e] courts to grant buyout or 
dissolution, not merely where minority shareholders are the victims of the 
unfairly prejudicial misuse of control power by majority shareholders, but 
also in any circumstances where the minority shareholders are found to be 
in deeply embittered or grievously disappointing circumstances.”277 A 
judicial preference for buyout as an exit solution not only alleviates undue 
burden on the majority shareholder but also favors both equitable 
compensation for the minority and as permanence for the corporate 
enterprise. 
With buyout available as a judicial remedy, minority interests are 
compensated and exit is accomplished with the least amount of disruption, 
both to the family members involved as well as to the business enterprise. 
b. Eliminating the Friends and Family Discount 
If fair-value buyout were a required option,278 helping minority 
shareholders receive value for their shares without the total dissolution of 
the company, the question then becomesWhat constitutes fair value?279 
Two questions in particular arise. Timing is a significant issue (similar to 
some divorce proceedings) because the value of a company can change 
dramatically in short time frames. The larger question, however, is whether 
or not “fair value” precludes the application of discounts. 
With closely held companies, a discount for lack of marketability is 
often applied when valuing shares because of the relative difficulty of 
converting the shares to cash. Relatedly, a discount is also applied when 
valuing the shares of a minority shareholder because of the difficulty in 
 
 275 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 35, at 6. 
 276 For objections to the mandatory buyout proposal, see Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied 
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of 
Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 70–72 (1982) (arguing against any 
assumption that a buyout is painless). 
 277 Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative 
Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 837 (1985). 
 278 ”[S]hareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair 
value of the shares.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 279 See Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 310–11. 
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finding buyers who are willing to purchase such shares.280 In corporate 
cases, discounts are routinely applied in buyout situations even when fair-
value statutes exist, and minority shareholders are consequently penalized 
for ownership of shares that are difficult to both value and sell. 
 Divorce courts have typically understood the basic fairness of 
applying the valuation discounts only when it benefits the “minority” party. 
In McCulloch v. McCulloch, for example, the trial court awarded the wife 
25% of the two family companies and, speaking to the valuation question 
on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied both marketability and 
illiquidity discounts.281 Discounts were appropriate, the court stated, not 
just because they reflected the lower value of these shares but also because 
they prevented the wife’s share of the marital estate from being artificially 
inflated in value.282 The court also observed that, “if the trial justice had 
awarded [the wife] the cash equivalent of her equitable ownership interest 
in the companies, or if he had crafted some other assignment, such 
discounts would not be necessary.”283 
In contrast, in Moore v. Moore,284 when the wife retained ownership of 
the company, the court stated: “[W]e find no justification for discounting 
the value of Candelabra in this case due to lack of marketability. Because 
Wife will retain ownership of Candelabra, we see no legitimate reason to 
indulge in the fiction of a marketability discount.”285 Divorce courts 
therefore apply marketability discounts variably in order to protect the 
vulnerable spouse, looking at both the equities of dividing the marital estate 
as well as the likelihood of share resale. 
In the corporate law domain, courts and legislatures should likewise 
resist the fiction of share resale and focus instead on equitable 
compensation for the minority shareholder. With these guideposts in 
sight—and because parties are not seeking to manipulate calculations 
pertaining to the marital estate—it may well be that “[m]inority and 
marketability discounts have no place in shareholder oppression 
 
 280 McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 822–23 (R.I. 2013) (“[A] minority shareholder lacks 
control over the company, and therefore, the value of his or her stock is diluted in comparison to that of 
a majority shareholder.”). 
 281 Id. at 822. 
 282 In a similar situation, a New Jersey court concluded:  
We see no reason to reward the spouse who holds title to the shares by allowing him to retain the 
value of the entire bloc at a bargain price . . . . Here, allowing the marketability or minority 
discounts would unfairly minimize the marital estate to [the wife’s] detriment and is inconsistent 
with the concept of equitable distribution. 
Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 283 McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 822. 
 284 779 S.E.2d 533, 551 (S.C. 2015). 
 285 Id. 
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disputes.”286 To this end, statutes should clarify that fair value means 
“enterprise value” rather than fair market value. Similarly, when faced with 
“fair value” language, even in the absence of a fair-value statute, courts can 
and should eliminate discounts if they serve no purpose other than to 
penalize the minority interest. 
2. A Parting Gift from Harry Winston 
While divorce law is one source of rulemaking expertise, inheritance 
law provides another. Inheritance law can offer models for corporate law 
with respect to the standards for enhanced fiduciary duty as well as the 
intervention of donor intent. The story of the rivalry and prolonged 
litigation between Harry Winston’s sons is a good example and provides 
lessons for the development of new solutions in corporate law. 
Harry Winston, who built the famous Fifth Avenue jewelry company 
from the ground up into a multimillion-dollar enterprise and locus of 
prestige, had two sons. The sons, Ronald and Bruce, had different 
personalities, passions, and aptitudes for work. Harry Winston is reported 
as having said: “I have two sons . . . one is a genius and one is a moron.”287 
Because of these differences, Harry Winston planned his estate such that 
both sons would receive equal income from the business but Ronald was 
made one of the trustees of the trust holding the corporate shares while 
Bruce was not.288 
Once Harry Winston and his wife died, Ronald undertook to squeeze 
Bruce out of the company. Ronald terminated Bruce’s employment289 and, 
at the same time, continued the corporate policy of not paying out any 
dividends. Bruce was left without any ability to extract value from his 
shares while Ronald’s salary “steadily increased from $248,000.00 in 1979 
to $1,138,000 in 1990,” despite a decline in corporate profitability.290 
 
 286 Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 318; see also Robert C. Art, 
supra note 27, at 405 (“Oregon case law is quite clear. Neither a marketability nor a minority discount 
should be applied in oppression cases.”). 
 287 Nina Burleigh, The Trouble with Harry Winston, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 18, 1999), 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/bizfinance/biz/features/1028/index2.html [https://perma.cc/X29D-
39ZH]; see also Karen E. Boxx, Too Many Tiaras: Conflicting Fiduciary Duties in the Family-Owned 
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Ronald also reorganized stock, over the wishes of the two other trustees 
and Bruce, such that Bruce’s stock was rendered valueless.291 
In the Surrogate’s Court, Ronald argued that “his father’s primary 
objective [in his will] . . . was to provide a mechanism for the ‘preservation 
and perpetuation of the Winston family enterprise’ under Ronald’s 
management and control.”292 Furthermore, any “debilitating effect of an in-
kind distribution upon the value of Bruce’s half share of the trust and his 
corresponding inability to receive income was anticipated by the decedent 
as a natural consequence of his estate and business plan.”293 In other words, 
Ronald argued that he was appropriately exercising his best business 
judgment in following his father’s wishes. 
The court saw matters differently. The court concluded that Harry 
Winston had meant for Ronald to run the business but had also clearly 
intended to provide equally for the siblings. Consequently, the court stated:  
[F]or Ronald to conclude . . . that Harry intended to vest absolute control of 
the family enterprise in him for the balance of his career and to subordinate 
Bruce’s inheritance to this alleged dominant and paramount intention . . . is 
simply not supported by a reasonable construction and interpretation of the 
Will.294 
Invoking Ronald’s fiduciary duties as a trustee, the court further stated: 
“The fiduciary responsibilities conferred upon Ronald do not evince 
Harry’s intent to afford him special treatment, but to the contrary, impose 
on Ronald a special fiduciary obligation of fairness and undivided loyalty 
in his management of the family business and his dealings with family 
members.”295 
Faced with the same pattern of oppressive behavior as in the minority 
shareholder oppression cases, the result here was different for two reasons. 
First, the fiduciary standard used to evaluate Ronald’s behavior was a trust 
law standard that presented a lower bar for breach than corporate fiduciary 
duty, especially with respect to self-dealing and conflicted transactions.296 
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Traditional fiduciary duty in trust law has also focused on protecting the 
best interests of the beneficiary, not necessarily on judging the malfeasance 
of the trustee. This lesson is important for family businesses because 
business shares are often held and transferred, especially 
intergenerationally, through trusts.297 Furthermore, some scholars have 
suggested that this enhanced standard of fiduciary duty be used in minority 
oppression cases whenever courts engage in a fiduciary duty analysis.298 As 
one commentator has remarked:  
By shifting the inquiry from the beneficiary’s best interests to a more limited 
focus on the fiduciary’s malfeasance, these [new fiduciary duty] tests provide 
greater latitude . . . for corporate fiduciaries to pursue their own interests, and 
diminish the power of the law to inspire and enforce high standards of 
business ethics.299 
A shift back to the traditional trust law framework in all fiduciary duty 
analyses could, therefore, help minority shareholders. 
Second, the positive result for Bruce in the Winston case was a 
product of the court’s determination that Winston intended to treat his sons 
equally, particularly in terms of income. Will construction intervened and 
provided the template for asset and income management. Although relevant 
primarily for shares held in trust or transferred by bequest, the Winston case 
suggests a role in these family business cases for the guidance that comes 
from instructional documents such as will and trust instruments. These 
documents can serve as evidence of a parent’s desire for an equality norm 
to rule distributions and asset allocation among children, as in the Winston 
case. More broadly, these documents can provide crucial information about 
family governance that may help shape corporate governance in family 
businesses. These documents include not only wills and trust instruments 
but the family “charters” and “constitutions” that wealth management 
advisors commonly suggest families create to guide generational changes 
and wealth transfer.300 
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Inheritance rules, then, can be instructive in determining a fiduciary 
duty standard for family businesses and may also help unearth information 
and instructions about a family’s vision for its corporate presence. 
B. Statutory Reform for Corporate Families 
Apart from family law solutions for corporate law reform, there are 
also corporate statutory reforms that state legislatures can enact to better 
protect corporate family members based on the specific ways in which 
family businesses organize and operate. As discussed in Part I, virtually all 
the states have some kind of statutory protection for minority shareholders 
on the books, with the notable exception of Delaware.301 The protections 
that these statutes offer range greatly. Statutes differ, for example, with 
respect to standard of liability (e.g., reasonable expectations, fiduciary 
duty, fraud, and illegality) and what remedies are available. Some states do, 
however, understand the predicament of corporate family members subject 
to shareholder oppression. These states provide model statutory language 
for other states moving forward.302 In this Section, I suggest several 
statutory reforms meant to further bolster protection for corporate family 
members. 
1. Working for the Family Business 
One statutory reform with the potential to benefit corporate family 
members in particular entails adding language that protects minority 
shareholders not just as shareholders but also as directors, officers, and 
employees. The New Jersey statute, for example, provides for relief if 
company directors “have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more 
minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, 
or employees.”303 Few other state statutes, however, provide similar 
protections.304 
When this language is absent, corporate family members are 
vulnerable. For example, in Franchino v. Franchino, a Michigan court 
concluded that the minority shareholder oppression statute did not cover 
employment termination when a father fired his minority shareholder 
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son.305 When the father removed the son from the board of directors and 
terminated his employment, the son argued that his removal “constituted 
oppression of his rights as a shareholder because he received the bulk of his 
share of the corporate profits through his salary and expected to participate 
in [the company’s] management.”306 The court disagreed. The court 
observed that the statute “only gives rise to a cause of action in cases where 
a minority shareholder suffered oppression in his capacity as a 
shareholder.”307 Other state statutes such as New Jersey’s, the court 
mentioned, were drafted in such a way as to protect the rights of not only 
shareholders but also “directors, officers, or employees.”308 But not 
Michigan’s. Consequently, the court held that the termination, because it 
did not implicate the son’s shareholder rights, was not material to a claim 
of shareholder oppression. 
This type of statutory reform is particularly important because of the 
ways in which family businesses typically choose to organize. In family 
businesses, as opposed to public corporations, the expectation of 
employment is much higher. In these companies, “a more intimate and 
intense relationship exists between capital and labor,”309 and family 
members who are shareholders “usually expect employment and a 
meaningful role in management.”310 Moreover, many family 
businessesHarry Winston, Inc. includedprefer to compensate family 
members as employees rather than paying dividends.311 The drafters of the 
New Jersey statute acknowledged these phenomena directly in the 
comments to the 1972 amendments, stating: “These [amendments] reflect 
the fact that in a closely held corporation oppressive conduct often takes 
the form of freezing-out a minority shareholder by removing him from his 
various offices or by substantially diminishing his power or 
compensation.”312 
This statutory fix will not, of course, help all employment cases. 
Corporate family members will still encounter difficulties overcoming the 
at-will presumption inherent in most hiring situations, especially in the 
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absence of an employment contract or ample evidence that the family 
member had reasonable expectations for continuing employment. Likewise, 
when a majority shareholder has a “mixed motive” for terminating the 
family member, reinstatement or compensation will likely be an uphill 
battle. These problems point to the difficulties of overcoming the business 
judgment rule (as well as potential deficiencies in the current understanding 
of a corporate family member’s reasonable expectations). 
Nevertheless, recognizing the distinctive ways in which family 
businesses organize both leadership and labor, legislatures should expand 
protections past those already available to shareholders and bring board 
leadership and company management into the fold. 
2. Reasonable Family Expectations 
The most common among reforms has been states adding the 
“reasonable expectations” language to their statutes in order to clarify what 
approach courts should take and how to evaluate oppression claims. The 
reasonable expectations language and standard has, as one scholar 
observed, “secured a firm toehold as the basis by which courts determine if 
minority shareholders are entitled to relief after dissension arises within a 
close corporation.”313 Currently, approximately twenty states use the 
reasonable expectations framework to evaluate minority oppression 
claims.314 
Going forward, however, the concept of reasonable expectations needs 
to be sharpened. As one scholar has observed: “The Reasonable 
Expectations approach depends on the meaning of the word ‘reasonable’ 
and, therefore, requires a deeper theory of shareholder rights and 
obligations.”315 Courts have already recognized that “shareholders’ 
expectations in a close corporation differ from shareholders’ expectations 
in publicly held corporations and may not always be reflected in articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, shareholders’ agreements or other writings.”316 
Taking this inquiry one step further, however, it is equally important to 
understand and determine what the reasonable expectations of a family 
member are and how they might differ from the reasonable expectations of 
any other stakeholder. The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized this 
in a leading reasonable expectations case, stating that reasonable 
expectations “are to be ascertained by examining the entire history of the 
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participants’ relationship.”317 Understanding family histories and what 
family members expect based on those relationships helps to construct a 
theory of shareholder rights based on family status and belonging. 
One reasonable expectation of corporate family members is 
participating in the management and governance of the company. That is to 
say, corporate family members expect to have a voice in the company’s 
operations. Some courts have recognized this: “[T]he primary expectations 
of minority shareholders include an active voice in management of the 
corporation and input as an employee.”318 Family members in particular 
may expect to have a voice based on the fact that they have voice in the 
family context and that expectation spills over into the workplace. For 
these reasons, one scholar has suggested a “voice-based framework” for 
evaluating minority oppression claims, suggesting that when these 
shareholders are stripped of the opportunity to have a voice in the company 
that their oppression claims should receive increased scrutiny.319 
Similarly, many corporate family members expect to benefit from 
some type of employment in the family business. Family members help 
build businesses together, they inherit businesses, and they help out as 
needed in the collective endeavor. Family businesses often thrive because 
of the willingness of family members to devote time and energy to the 
enterprise. Accordingly, “[p]articipants often expect to participate in 
management and that their contribution will be recognized in the form of 
salary even though those matters are not contained in any written 
document.”320 Moreover, because of the common practice in family 
businesses of not paying dividends and relying on salary to compensate 
corporate family members, employment takes on increased relevance. In 
some cases, with Harry Winston and his sons for example, both sons were 
on the payroll even though one son was not expected to contribute to the 
company in the same way as the other. Bruce Winston’s salary was his 
benefit, his dividend, his monthly allotment. Employment in the family 
businesses takes on many meanings and serves multiple purposes. 
Consequently, lifetime employment may be a reasonable expectation; some 
form of employment may be a reasonable expectation; and, most 
importantly, it is likely that these expectations will not be recorded in a 
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written agreement in family businesses where the foundation is built on 
preexisting relationships of trust and understanding.321 
Ultimately, corporate family members expect to be able to extract 
value of some kind and in some manner from their shares. Whether through 
inclusion in governance or on the payroll, corporate family members expect 
to be a part of not only the family but also the corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal norms of bargaining embedded in corporate law expect that 
self-interest and the desire to self-protect will inform the bargaining 
practices of corporate actors and that these individuals will behave as 
rational actors. And yet, corporate family members, who populate the 
majority of businesses, do not bargain the way that corporate law expects. 
Where does that leave siblings, cousins, children, in-laws, and 
steprelations? This absence of protections for a particularly vulnerable 
sector of corporate actors has led to unwelcome results: “Unfair treatment 
of holders of minority interests in family companies and other closely held 
corporations by persons in control of those corporations is so widespread 
that it is a national business scandal.”322 There is, however, a model for 
asset division at relationship termination that provides financial and legal 
protections to vulnerable parties based on an alternate understanding of 
bargaining: family wealth law. Both divorce law and inheritance law 
safeguard vulnerable spouses when marriage ends, guaranteeing financial 
benefits and entitlements, because marriage law considers spouses to be 
overly bounded bargainers. Taking lessons from family wealth law, then, 
corporate law can learn how to better treat and accommodate corporate 
family members. Ultimately, weaving together corporate and family law 
will benefit the millions of happy and unhappy families alike who build 
organizations, take risks, follow inspiration, and seek fulfillment in the 
family business. 
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